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MORAL TURPITUDE
Julia Ann Simon-Kerr*
INTRODUCTION

This Article gives the first account of the moral turpitude standard, tracing its
trajectory from the early American law of defamation' to evidence law, where it
has been used for witness impeachment, 2 and then to legal areas as diverse as
voting rights,3 juror disqualification, 4 professional licensing,' and immigration
law,6 where it is used as a collateral sanctioning mechanism. "Moral turpitude"
was formalized as a legal standard by common law courts seeking a manageable
test for slander per se. 7 If an allegedly damaging accusation suggested a plaintiff
had cominitted a crime involving moral turpitude, reputational injury was
presumed, and the plaintiff did not need to prove damages. 8 At the same time, the

* 0 2012 Julia Simon-Kerr, Associate Professor of Law, The University of
Connecticut School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Wesleyan University. I would
like to thank the following people for their insights and suggestions on this and earlier
drafts: Daniel Abebe, Douglas Baird, Alex Boni-Saenz, Mary Anne Case, Anthony Casey,
Adam Cox, Lee Fennell, Robert Ferguson, Bernard Harcourt, Aziz Huq, Virginia Kerr,
Saul Levmore, Daniel Markovits, Richard McAdams, Jonathan Masur, Martha Nussbaum,
Andres Sawicki, Naomi Schoenbaum, Alex Stein, James Whitman, John Witt and
workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School.
1 See Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188, 191-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (adopting new
definition of slander per se using "moral turpitude").
2 See, e.g., People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 573-74, 582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838)
(employing "moral turpitude" in the context of witness impeachment).
3 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 182 (providing for disenfranchisement of
those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude).
4 See, e.g., 3 REVISED LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA art. II, § 199 (1871) ("A
person is not competent to act as a juror . . . [w]ho has been convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude."); FIRST LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE
TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, THE HOWELL CODE ch. 47 § 4, at 294 (1865) ("Nor shall any

person be competent to act as juror who has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor,
involving moral turpitude.").
5 See, e.g., GENERAL STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

§ 19 (3d ed. 1881)

("Upon his being convicted of felony, or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, in
either of which cases the record of his conviction is conclusive evidence."); THE CODE OF
ALABAMA, ch. 10,

§ 747 (1852) ("An attorney must be removed ...

[u]pon his being

convicted of a felony other than manslaughter, or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude;
in either of which cases the record of his conviction is conclusive evidence.").
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2011); Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1,
26 Stat. 1084.
7 MARTIN L. NEWELL & MASON H. NEWELL, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL IN

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 112 (3d ed. 1914).
8 See id. at 119.
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standard protected the defendant and the courts from suits over trifles.9 As moral
turpitude spread and was appropriated for use in other fields, it functioned
differently, working as a standard that purported to judge character instead of
reputational harm. It was used not to sort out entitlement to civil damages, but
instead to determine who should be permitted to join or continue to belong to a
particular community or who could exercise basic citizenship rights.'o Today,
although it continues in defamation law in some jurisdictions and as an evidentiary
impeachment standard in a few significant others,' its most prevalent use is as a
sanctioning mechanism, particularly in the law of immigration, where it creates a
category of offenses that warrant deportation.' 2
Despite its presence in the law for over two centuries and its seeming
3
relevance to continuing debates over the relationship between law and morality,
the moral turpitude standard has received little scholarly attention. Only in the
context of immigration law and professional licensing has it provoked limited
comment, all of which has been critical.1 4 Yet there has been no systematic study
9 Id. at 122, 129.

10 Infra Part III.
" The two outliers are California and Texas. See infra Part II.
12 In the ten years leading up to the publication of this Article, the phrase "moral
turpitude" has appeared in nearly 3,500 reported federal cases and almost 2,500 state cases,
many involving immigration issues. These numbers do not include administrative-agency
decisions, state or federal, or the often-unpublished proceedings of professional licensing
boards. Yet, the term "moral turpitude" itself is an antique in contemporary popular culture.
When it was cited by Warner Brothers as a reason for firing actor Charlie Sheen, a blogger
asked, "Moral turpitude! How often do you get to use that in a sentence?" Charlie Sheen Is
Fired-Bring on the Moral Turpitude, L.A. TIMES BLOGS (Mar. 7, 2011, 4:51 PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/gossip/2011/03/charlie-sheen-fired-two-and-a-half-mensnl-remix.html.
1 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593 (1958) (providing a normative discussion of philosophical approaches to the
relationship between law and morals); Dan M. Kahan, IgnoranceofLaw Is an Excuse-But
Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REv. 127, 128-29 (1997) (exploring the relationship
between criminal law and morals); Alan C. Michaels, "Rationales" of Criminal Law Then
and Now: For a Judgmental Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54, 57 (2000) (discussing
moral blameworthiness in the context of criminal law); Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice
Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive Criminal Law, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 315, 316-21 (1996) (reviewing PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY,
JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995)).

14 The most frequently cited article on moral turpitude is a short Note published in the
HarvardLaw Review in 1929. Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV.
117, 117-21 (1929). There have been six law journal articles devoted to the standard since
the HarvardLaw Review Note. All six are focused on its impact in immigration law. See
Brian C. Harms, Redefining "Crimes Of Moral Turpitude": A Proposalto Congress, 15
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259 (2001) (concluding that a bright line approach to moral turpitude
should be used in immigration cases); Mary Holper, Deportationfor a Sin: Why Moral
Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REv. 647 (2012) [hereinafter Holper,
Deportationfor a Sin] (arguing that moral turpitude is void for vagueness); Mary Holper,
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of its history, its practical application, or the underlying rationales for its use across
substantive areas of law. We have no theory for why this standard-which not only
assumes moral consensus, but also the competence of judges to identify it"-has
salience in so many areas of our legal system. The standard has likewise received
little attention from scholars interested in the descriptive enterprise of showing
how "moral phraseology"l 6 functions in our legal system. Similarly, the standard
The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241
(2011) [hereinafter Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test] (arguing against an approach to
moral turpitude in immigration law adopted in the final days of the Bush administration);
Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The CategoricalApproachfor Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
After Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 313 (2011) (arguing for a uniform, less
contextual approach to reviewing the record in immigration cases involving moral
turpitude); Derrick Moore, Note, "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude ": Why the Void-ForVagueness Argument is Still Available and Meritorious,41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 813, 81416 (2008) (arguing that despite the Supreme Court's ruling in 1951 that the standard was
not void for vagueness, changes in constitutional doctrine render that argument available
again); Amy Wolper, Note, Unconstitutionaland Unnecessary: A Cost/Benefit Analysis of
"Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude" in the Immigration and NationalityAct, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1907, 1908-09 (2010) (arguing that the moral turpitude standard is unnecessary
after the 1996 Immigration and Nationality Act, overly costly, and void for vagueness).
Additionally, several books on immigration include discussions of moral turpitude. See,
e.g., VINCENT J. CANNATO, AMERICAN PASSAGE: THE HISTORY OF ELLIS ISLAND 260-86
(2009); JANE PERRY CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO
EUROPE 161-214 (Arno Press 1969) (1931). In the context of professional licensing, Debra
Rhode's article, Moral Character as a Professional Standard, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 551-52
(1985), includes a brief discussion of the "moral turpitude" criterion for bar licensing.
1 Perhaps the most widely studied standard that, like some iterations of moral
turpitude, focuses on community morality is the Supreme Court test to identify obscene
speech unprotected by the First Amendment. As framed in 1957, the test asks "whether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 489 (1957). The test provoked Justice Stewart's famous comments about
pornography:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand
to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Commonly held
ideas of moral rectitude are also bound up in various common law doctrines, among them
unconscionability. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95 (N.J.
1960) (holding Automobile Manufacturers Association's attempted disclaimer of implied
warranty of merchantability inimical to public good and therefore invalid).
16

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 463 (1897)

(describing, for example, the legal use of words such as "malice" as requiring an inquiry
into conduct rather than actual moral status or maliciousness, as suggested by its facial
meaning).
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has been unremarked in the growing legal literature that draws upon one or another
conception of virtue ethics for insight into the work of judges" and to interrogate
substantive and procedural issues in various areas of the law.' 8
Tellingly, the most frequent attention to the standard has come in a form that
eschews analysis. Courts have described the standard as "notoriously plastic," 9
jurisprudence on moral turpitude as an "amorphous morass,"20 and its use as an
"invitation to judicial chaos." 21 In the only case to date in which the U.S. Supreme
Court examined the standard in immigration law, Justice Jackson wrote, in dissent,
that moral turpitude had "no sufficiently definite meaning to be a constitutional
standard for deportation." 2 2 The few scholarly articles on the standard, almost all in

See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:A Virtue-Centered Theory of
Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003) (explaining judicial disagreement through the
lens of virtue-centered theory). There is a vast and complex philosophic literature on virtue
ethics. See, e.g., ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999) (defining virtue ethics
as an approach in normative ethics that emphasizes moral character in contrast to Kantian
approach that emphasizes duties and utilitarian approach that emphasizes consequences);
Martha Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in THE QUALITY OF
LIFE 242, 242-276 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993) (responding to critics
who view virtue ethics as a version of relativism); Martha C. Nussbaum, Virtue Ethics: A
Misleading Category?, 3 J. ETHICS 163, 163-72 (1999) (questioning taxonomy that treats
virtue ethics as third major approach because, inter alia, both Kantianism and utilitarianism
contain treatments of virtue).
18 Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence,Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort
Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000); Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 97 (2002); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1423 (1995); Katrina M. Wyman, Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue Ethics?
A Skeptical Comment, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 991 (2009).
19 Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2008).
20 Partyka v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 417 F.3d 408,
409 (3d Cir. 2005).
21 People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 134 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
22 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Courts
have cited Jackson's dissent in Jordan in myriad subsequent opinions. See, e.g., Ali, 521
F.3d at 739 (noting that moral turpitude appeared "so ambulatory that some Justices ...
thought it unconstitutionally vague"). The judiciary's discontent has produced no
legislative response. The Supreme Court recently denied the retroactive application of an
exclusion provision for moral turpitude convictions. See Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
1479, 1483-84 (2012). It seems inevitable that the Supreme Court will be forced-to
confront the question of what moral turpitude means in immigration law in the not-toodistant future. The Court has recently held that immigrants must be informed of the
potential deportation consequences of their pleas, a task made herculean by the
permutations of the moral turpitude standard. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1

1483 (2010) ("[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give

correct advice is equally clear.").
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immigration law, have argued, in agreement, that it is unconstitutionally vague and
23
invites inconsistent and unpredictable judgments.
These criticisms are borne out, to an extent, by observable legal outcomes.
Moral turpitude jurisprudence today suggests that society condemns as immoral
the petty thief,24 but not the person who attacks a police officer. 25 If the federal
courts are to be believed and the standard taken at face value, then "aggravated
fleeing" 26 is inherently base, vile, and depraved, while some forms of aggravated
assault do not violate community norms of morality.27 Drunk driving repeatedly is
deemed not to involve moral turpitude,28 but drunk driving with a suspended
license is assessed differently. 2 9 All statutory rape involves moral turpitude, but so
did same-sex sodomy, until it received constitutional protection in Lawrence v.
Texas. 30 In evidence law, moral turpitude jurisprudence holds that the prostitute
lacks credibility ' but the batterer does not.32
The dearth of scholarship on the standard may thus be accounted for by some
consensus that the problem with the standard is its vagueness and that further
inquiry into what appears to be a morally infused doctrinal morass would not be
fruitful. Further, the standard does not fit comfortably into traditional discussions
of law and morality. Arguably, the standard is not normative because in most
settings it applies after the fact to acts that have led to a criminal conviction, acts
that by definition have been pronounced as wrongful. Yet, if as Holmes famously
said, the law is "the witness and external deposit of our moral life,"33 moral
turpitude deserves closer attention, and not simply because of the seriousness of
the consequences it visits upon those who fall upon the wrong side of its lens. The
standard asks courts not just to witness but also to testify to the nation's moral life

23

See, e.g., Holper, Deportationfor A Sin, supra note 14, at 663-701 (arguing that

moral turpitude is void for vagueness); Moore, supra note 14, at 814-16; Wolper, supra
note 14, at 1907-10; see supra text accompaning note 14.
24 Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 261 (2d Cir. 2000).
25 Zaranska v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 400 F. Supp. 2d 500, 511 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
26 Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming that
"aggravated
fleeing," a crime under Illinois law, involves moral turpitude).
27 Carr V.INS, 86 F.3d 949, 950-51 (9th Cir. 1996).
28 Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 83-84 (B.I.A. 2001)
(en banc).
29 Mamolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 917 (9th Cir.
2009).
30 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
3' See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, No. C052744, 2011 WL 1671560, at *24 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 4, 2011) ("Misdemeanor conduct of prostitution represents a crime of moral
turpitude.").
32 See, e.g., People v. Mansfield, 200 Cal. App. 3d 82, 88-89 (1988) (refusing to
permit impeachment of a witness with a conviction of "felony battery" or "battery resulting
in serious bodily injury" because that offense is not "a crime of moral turpitude").
33 Holmes, supra note 16, at 459.
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by making value judgments couched in moral terms with no other guidepost than,
in the words of one judge, the court's "extralegal moral sense."3 4
This Article takes on the project of "deliberate reconsideration" of moral
turpitude, a reconsideration that bears out another of Holmes's observations-that
without history we cannot know and examine "the precise scope of rules which it
is our business to know."35 In order to elucidate this standard across areas and over
time and thereby "get the dragon out of the cave," 36 this Article addresses a series
of questions: What is the origin of the phrase "moral turpitude"? How did it find its
way into American law as a legal standard? How has it evolved over time and in
what settings? How have courts defined it? How have they handled or shied from
the task of applying their "extra-legal moral sense" to identify acts that deserve the
label? And, finally, because law has an important educative function, what, if
anything, does it tell us about our moral knowledge and preferences? Is this really
a standard about morality or are we confusing what are really a set of honor norms
with some deeper concept of virtue or goodness and making serious errors because
of it? This Article reaches several conclusions.
First, courts have not been eager to use the discretion they have had to apply
the moral turpitude standard according to their own, society's, or philosophers'
notions of morality. Early on, they settled on a definition of moral turpitude as
involving "conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the
private and social duties man owes to his fellow men or to society in general."3
Also early on, courts decided that the question to be answered was whether the
conduct "involv[es] grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the
community."3 8 Over the standard's two-hundred-year history, however, few courts
have been interested in exploring either of those disparate ideas of moral
wrongfulness, which they have almost always elided. Even in early defamation
cases, courts were troubled at the lack of familiar legal guideposts and disinclined
to use the standard as a platform for their own views of moral conduct.3 1 Other
courts simply declined to adopt the standard because it would require them to
"search moral and ethical authors, rather than legal writers." 40 As one state
supreme court justice wrote in 1991, "as society has increasingly become both
more secular and pluralistic, there is less consensus about what is immoral."A

34 United States ex rel. Griffo v. McCandless, 28 F.2d 287, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1928)
(asserting agreement that the federal "moral turpitude" standard was intended to cover
those acts "not only condemned by the law and denounced as criminal, but those which the
extralegal moral sense pronounces to evidence moral turpitude or depravity" and
concluding that an assault and battery conviction did not satisfy this test).
3 Holmes, supra note 16, at 469.
36

Id.

Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007).
38 Id. (citation omitted).
3
1Infra Part I.B.
40

Skinner v. White, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 471, 474 (1836) (per curiam).

41

In re Berk, 602 A.2d 946, 951 (Vt. 1991) (Morse, J. concurring).
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"Moral turpitude," he argued, "is a compass with the directional needle

removed." 4 2
Second, courts' reluctance to confront moral questions on any deep level has
interfered with their ability to engage in reasoned analysis of the issues the moral
turpitude standard is supposed to resolve. When the standard moved to
immigration law, federal judges were no more eager than state judges to make post
facto moral value judgments without guidance. Beginning in the 1920s, the federal
courts developed what is now called the categorical approach, ,a formalistic
approach that prevents them from probing below the surface of a conviction to any
of the facts that might inform a moral judgment about the act.43 Instead, the
categorical approach focuses exclusively on whether a conviction required the
element of scienter. 44 The categorical approach has spread into areas as diverse as
professional licensing and evidence. 4 5 Yet even as this approach has come to
control in many cases, courts insist, without explanation, that certain per se
categories are not governed by it.4 6 Those categories are fraud and sex crimes.47
Third, this account demonstrates that cultural norms that were salient when
moral turpitude first entered the law still drive the outcomes of cases. This Article
uses the phrases "honor norms" or "honor code" to describe these norms which
were, as this Article shows, drawn from beliefs about moral rectitude that were
widely held in the early nineteenth century. This early honor code was gendered,
condemning a lack of chastity in women and deceptive business practices and
dishonesty in men.4 8 Violent behavior, in contrast, was treated more forgivingly. 4 9
In the exceptions to the present-day scienter rule-which require that crimes
involving fraud or sexual deviance always fall within the standard even as crimes
of violence can be excluded for lack of scienterso-modem moral turpitude
jurisprudence simply mimics a nineteenth-century system of values.
Viewing moral turpitude against the background of the honor code, this
Article shows that the problem with the standard is not its vagueness but that it is
overdetermined by its history. Rather than suffering from too little meaning, the
standard suffers from too much. Although superficially both the strength and
weakness of the standard might be seen as its plasticity, courts have declined to
engage in the project of keeping it up to date with the ever-evolving and oftencontested morals of a pluralistic society. Courts themselves have contributed to the
misperception that they are treating moral turpitude as "necessarily adaptive," and
"defined by the state of public morals."5 1 In fact, however, they have for the most
42

d.

43 Infra Part III.B(2)(a).

' Infra Part III.B(2)(b).
46

id.
Id.

47

id.

45

48 Infra Part

I.A.
id.
oInfra Part III.B(2)(b).

49

5 Beck v. Stitzel, 21 Pa. 522, 524 (1853).
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part ignored community moral sentiments when applying the standard. Nor do the
opinions show courts exercising their own "extralegal moral sense" in making
moral turpitude assessments. Rather, in the years since it entered American
common law, moral turpitude has preserved, but not transformed, the set of
morally framed norms of the early nineteenth century that first shaped its
application.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I shows that moral turpitude was first
formalized as a legal standard in 1809 when a New York court adopted the phrase
as part of the test for slander per se. It illuminates moral turpitude's origins in the
political and social discourse of the late eighteenth century as a catchphrase that
signaled fundamental breaches of a gendered honor code. It argues that the honor
code served as an implicit guide to courts applying the standard. Accordingly, in
early defamation cases, courts had little difficulty finding that accusations of oathbreaking, fraud, and their extensions-such as theft or destruction of property
belonging to someone else, as well as accusations of crimes of sexual deviance,
particularly by women-imputed moral turpitude. As it reflected the honor code,
the standard was, at least initially, a reasonable way to identify accusations that
should be presumptively slanderous. Like other legal terms, it had "a core of
settled meaning" that corresponded with those offenses against honor norms that
would be most damaging to reputation and "a penumbra of debatable meaning., 52
In cases at the debatable margins, moral turpitude still did not function as an
adaptive legal standard. Courts' reluctance to make overt moral judgments led
them to resolve marginal cases by resorting to established common law formulas,
such as the malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction, or an analysis grounded in
scienter. 5 4 In both the core and the marginal cases, however, most courts
announced that moral turpitude meant inherently base, vile, or depraved conduct,
or conduct contrary to community morality.55
Part II turns to evidence law and describes the development of a jurisprudence
of moral turpitude as an impeachment standard. It shows that courts continued to
follow the core contours of the honor code, treating sex crimes and crimes
involving deception or fraud as permissible for impeachment while excluding
crimes involving violence. At the margins, just as in slander cases, courts used
familiar proxies such as malum in se or evil intent to identify crimes that would be
admissible to impeach witnesses. Yet these proxies were, if anything, even more
removed from the question of credibility than from moral turpitude itself. The
jurisprudential incoherence that resulted eventually proved untenable for most
courts, and despite its use in many states, the standard was not adopted by the
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 514 (1988) (citing Hart, supra
note 13, at 610).
5 Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1086 (2009) ("A
conventional argument for standards, as opposed to rules, is that standards ensure
flexibility for the future, thus reducing the magnitude and number of mistakes.").
54 See infra Parts I.B.2, II.B, III.B.2.
5 See Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1995); Vidal y Planas v. Landon,
104 F. Supp. 384, 390 (S.D. Cal. 1952); cases cited infra notes 221, 249, 389.
52
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drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Eventually, the vast majority of states
abandoned moral turpitude as an impeachment standard.
Part III focuses on the use of moral turpitude as a collateral sanctioning
mechanism in the context of voting rights and immigration. It shows that in these
areas, the honor norms carried forward by the standard appealed to legislatures
seeking to preserve existing hierarchies and social values. Moral turpitude was
used to police the boundaries of an ideal polity and was used invidiously to enforce
racial hierarchy.56 It appealed to state governments seeking to limit the franchise
and to the federal government as a way to block the entry of undesirable
immigrants. 57
Just as it had in its common law iterations, moral turpitude created difficulties
for the federal courts as an exclusion or deportation standard. Courts paid lip
service both to the idea that the standard meant "inherently base, vile, or depraved"
and to the suggestion that it should express the moral view of the community, here
defined as the nation as a whole. Yet they rejected the discretion offered under
either of these formulations. Instead, with remarkable fidelity, they reproduced the
common law contours of the standard and essentially carried forward honor norms
dating back to the early Republic. Certain core crimes-those involving deception,
fraud, or sex-are still viewed as involving moral turpitude per se. 58 Crimes of
violence are still a separate, less-censured category. At the margins, the federal
courts developed and continue to apply the decontextualized categorical approach
that places off limits the facts underlying an immigrant's conviction and focuses
instead on whether the element of scienter was required for conviction.59
In showing how moral turpitude has spread and yet not evolved in the law,
this Article lays a foundation for a broader conversation about its continuing
efficacy as well as its relevance to ongoing debates about law, morality, and
judicial behavior. Moral turpitude jurisprudence is remarkable today for the degree
to which judges have structured it to avoid the moral pronouncements it seems to
require, instead preserving old hierarchies and beliefs and drawing arbitrary lines
in marginal cases. This Article suggests, among other things, that if we seek to
base judicial intervention on moral judgment, we must look for other ways to
accomplish that goal.

5 It was not until the mid-1980s that a state law using moral turpitude was struck
down on equal protection grounds in the face of plain evidence that its purpose, as well as
its effect, was to disenfranchise blacks. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233

(1985).
5 See infra Part III.A.
58 See, e.g., Castle v.

INS, 541 F.2d 1064, 1066 (4th Cir. 1976) (labeling statutory
rape "moral turpitude per se").
59 Paradoxically, this abstracted approach to the moral turpitude analysis may have
enabled its survival as a standard by substituting an analysis of the elements of crimes for
an extralegal inquiry into community mores.

UTAH LAW REVIEW

1010

[No. 2

I. MORAL TURPITUDE AND THE LAW OF SLANDER

In 1809, the New York Supreme Court created a test for slander per se that
was adopted so widely that it would be termed the "American Rule" by the end of
the century.o In Brooker v. Coffin,' a defamation case involving a woman who
had been accused of prostitution, 62 the court held that a crime would be actionable
as slander per se only if the words, if true, would result in "indictment for a crime
involving moral turpitude, or subject [the person] to an infamous punishment." 63
Seeking a rule that would "conduce to certainty," 64 the court used the phrase
"moral turpitude" to demarcate those accusations so harmful to reputation that a
plaintiff would not need to offer proof of damages in order to prevail in a
defamation suit.
Moral turpitude was not a new phrase in 1809, but it was new to a formal role
in the common law. Until the New York Supreme Court used it in Brooker, the
phrase had made only descriptive appearances in judicial opinions in England and
the United States.65 Yet moral turpitude was a phrase that had clear content, even if
its boundaries were less clear. In the early nineteenth century, moral turpitude was
a familiar phrase, employed often by public figures to ascribe particular failings of
character to their rivals.66 In order to elucidate its cultural meaning, this Part
examines its grounding in the popular parlance of the early nineteenth century and
shows how it functioned as a catchphrase for a gendered honor code. It then turns
to the Brooker test and shows how moral turpitude's cultural meaning shaped its
legal applications.
A. Moral Turpitude: Reputation and Honor in PopularConsciousness

Moral turpitude was a popular phrase in the social and political discourse of
the early nineteenth century. It owed its early cultural significance to the fact that
male honor norms were a preoccupation of the elites who worked to shape the
political landscape of the early Republic.6 7 In published letters, pamphlets,
speeches, and even in their own private records, the leaders of the new country
worried about "[s]incerity of character . . . and the assumption of honor that

60

See NEWELL & NEWELL, supra note 7, at 7 (labelling Brooker's formulation the

"American Rule").
6' 5 Johns. 188, 188-89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
62
Id. at 191.

63

id.

" Id. at 192.
65 See, e.g., United

States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 134-35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (reporting
prosecutor William Wirt's argument in support of convicting Aaron Burr of treason that
"[e]very man knows that the moral turpitude consists in the mind and intention").
66 See infra Part I.A.

67 See ROBERT A. FERGUSON, READING THE EARLY REPUBLIC 128 (2004) ("Correct

conduct amounted to a preoccupation.").
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formed the foundation of that sincerity." 6 8 By extension, "[d]ishonor in print" was
a central concern because it could "damn[] a man's reputation for all time." 69 As
historian Joanne Freeman explains, "In a government lacking formal precedents
and institutional routines, reputation was the glue that held the polity together."70
Thus, rather than a government of rules, the early American republic was, to an
extent, "a government of character." 7 Honor codes, .in other words, were at the
heart of the political enterprise.
As a term for honor's opposite, and one that had been employed by the
72
classical thinkers who were widely read and admired by educated elites, moral
turpitude was ripe for rhetorical use in political discourse. For example, the
founders often cited Cicero when arguing for the existence of a "moral sense" that
should transcend expediency as the rationale for action. In De Finibus, Cicero
argues for a form of absolute morality, asserting that although there may be no
legal consequences, "the dishonesty of an action is . . . in itself execrable and
frightful." 74 As his words were translated in 1812, Cicero went on to say: "[A]s
virtue or moral excellency is for itself to be valued and desired, so vice or moral
turpitude is to be hated and avoided."7 1
Moral turpitude came to be used by early politicians as a catchphrase to sum
up traits they deemed undesirable in the new Republic. The founders devoted
considerable attention to the idea that the new nation could not survive without
values that would promote a "wholesome control." 6 In an 1819 letter, Thomas
Jefferson wondered aloud to John Adams whether the Roman Empire could have
been saved, even by Cicero's leadership, when that nation was so "steeped in
68

See id. at 129; see also

71

Id.

J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE 11 (1996)
(arguing that because of the focus on public welfare, in the early nineteenth century, civil
liberty had to "conform to the superior power of self-governing communities to legislate
and regulate in the public interest").
69 See JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 158 (2001).
70
Id. at 69.
WILLIAM

Both the nation's founders and the generally educated public shared an intense
interest in the Stoics and Cicero. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and
72

Capabilities: "Perception"Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REv. 4, 50 (2007); see
also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 103 (1992)

("Public morality was classical morality; people could not read enough about Cato and
Cicero.").
73 CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE
AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 177 (1994).
74 3 CICERO, DE FINIBUS 158 (Jeremy Collier, ed., Samuel Parker, trans., 1812).
75 Id.; see also 3 CICERO, DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM 256 (T. E. Page

& W.

H. D. Rouse, eds., 1914) ("Nihil est enim de quo minus dubitari possit quam et honesta
expetenda per se et eodem modo turpiaper se essefugienda.").
76 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Dec. 10, 1819), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON, MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON

328 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph, ed., 1829).
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corruption, vice, and venality." 7 7 According to Jefferson, the ancient nation most
likely lacked "the inculcations necessary to render the people a sure basis for the
structure of order and good government." 78 Among those inculcations were "in all
cases, to follow truth as the only safe guide," to be educated as to "what is right
and what [is] wrong," and "to be encouraged in habits of virtue, and deterred from
those of vice."79 Alexander Hamilton, too, saw a moral code centering on
truthfulness as essential to the country's success because of its importance in
protecting reputation and property. "[W]here is the security for property, for
reputation, for life," he asked, "if the sense of moral and religious obligation
deserts the oaths which are administered in courts of justice?"80 Jefferson,
Hamilton, and others thus actively promoted a vision of "honor" characterized by
oath-keeping, integrity, and industry.8'
This developing American ethos that demanded integrity, hard work, and
loyalty in male citizens 82 meant that deception, disloyalty, and the failure to
contribute productively to society were the primary traits condemned as moral
turpitude in men. In post-Revolutionary newspaper polemics, most often penned
by politicians and their allies, the phrase "moral turpitude" was used to connote
disloyalty, oath-breaking, and deception in financial matters. A typical example is
found in a best-selling 1803 pamphlet by William P. Van Ness, an Aaron Burr

77 id.

78

Id.

79

Id.

Alexander Hamilton, Washington's Farewell Address, in 7 ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 587 (John C. Hamilton, ed., 1851).
81 See ROGERS M. SMITH, Civic JDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY 140 (1997) ("Hamilton hoped to foster the kind of bustling, productive,
large-scale commercial polity that we identify today with liberal civic life . . . ."). Professor
80

Smith explains that by seeking to "attract commercial and financial elites" to invest in the
country, Hamilton also pursued a project that would inextricably tie the government to
"wealthy leaders ... reinforcing socioeconomic and political hierarchies." Id. at 141. In
Democracy in America, De Tocqueville observed the success of the promotion of industry
in America. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 235 (Philips Bradley,
ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1840). He wrote that honor in America was comprised of
different qualities than the ones that defined it in European countries. Id. In Europe,
conspicuous leisure was a badge of upper-class status and of honor. Id. at 152-53. In
America, in contrast, work was deemed a virtue and the wealthy man had to strive to
appear occupied lest he be thought a wastrel. Id. at 152-53, 235. De Tocqueville attributed
the differences to the need for a strong work ethic that would foster exploration and
development of the new country's vast resources. To neglect the "quiet virtues which tend
to ... encourage business," observed DeTocqueville, was to "incur public contempt." Id. at
235.
82 William Novak describes the commitment to furthering "the welfare of the whole

people and community" as a "fundamental ordering principle[] of the early American
polity." NOVAK, supra note 68, at 9.
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supporter.83 Van Ness attacked DeWitt Clinton, a Hamilton supporter and one of
Burr's antagonists, as "an adept . . . in moral turpitude; profoundly skilled in all
combinations of treachery and fraud." 8 4 Van Ness's barb was well chosen: one
reader analogized, his invective to "a whip of scorpions."85 His use of moral
turpitude in conjunction with "treachery and fraud" invoked the Ciceronian
concept that the virtues of loyalty and oath-keeping are the essence of moral
integrity and character while the "dishonesty of an action" is execrable.86
Another early public exchange, this one over an accusation that Thomas
Jefferson had promoted a worthless transfer of American debt-from the French to a
Dutch company, dramatized the use of moral turpitude to frame accusations of
deceptive business dealings. 87 In a 1792 letter defending Jefferson, Attorney
General Edmund Randolph wrote that such an accusation "involv[es] no small
degree of moral turpitude" and would "render the accused, if guilty, unworthy [of]
the confidence of his fellow citizens."88 In yet another example, an 1811 letter to
the editor of the Rhode Island American urged residents to withdraw their support
from their governor because he had invoked the statute of limitations to avoid
paying a debt to an elderly aunt. "Who of you," the author asked, "worth the
immense sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, would thus have
defrauded a widowed aunt? What heart but recoils at such moral turpitude and
dishonor?" 8 9 In 1812, yet another pseudonymous letter attacked James Madison for
the joint sins of fiscal irresponsibility and misplaced loyalty to the French. It
concluded, "I arraign you of falsehood, private views, ignorance, and the worst of
moral turpitude. As it involves not only your conscience, but the safety of millions,
fraud in the management of the public weal, if not of treachery! Vindicate yourself
if you can."O Notably, these early political writings contain no references to acts of
violence as involving moral turpitude.
Moral turpitude had a different set of meanings when applied to women.
Rather than suggesting intentional deception or disloyalty, the phrase signaled
violations of female honor norms requiring sexual purity. Offenses against chastity
" THOMAS FLEMING, DUEL: ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AARON BURR, AND THE FUTURE
OF AMERICA 125-27 (1999). The pamphlet rivaled Thomas Paine's Common Sense in
sales. Id. at 125.
84 ARISTIDES [WILLIAM VAN NESS], AN EXAMINATION OF THE VARIOUS CHARGES
EXHIBITED AGAINST AARON BURR, ESQ. VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 55

(1804).
85

See 22

JOHN ARTHUR GARRITY ET AL., AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY

230

(1999).
86 3 CICERO, supra note 74, at 158.

See Philip M. Marsh, Randolph and Hamilton: "Aristides" Replies to "An
American, " "Catullus, " and "Scourge," 72 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 247, 247-52
87

(1948).
88 Aristides, Letter to the Editor, For the Gazette of the United States, GAZETTE U.S.
(Phila.), Sept. 8, 1792, at 1.
89 A Freeman, Letter to the Editor, R.I. AM., Mar. 22, 1811, at 2.

90 Codrus, Letter to James Madison, Presidentof the United States, FED. REPUBLICAN

(Balt.), Feb. 6, 1812, at 3.
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were, at least for the white elites whose letters filled the newspapers and whose
ranks made up the judiciary, 91 the female counterpart to male oath breaking. 9 2
Women's sexual virtue was of such paramount importance to perceptions of their
integrity that attorneys routinely sought to impeach women with evidence of their
lack of chastity, a practice that did not extend to men.9 3 In public discourse and in
the courts, however, moral turpitude appeared far less frequently as a phrase to
brand women for sexual misconduct than it did with reference to deceptive
business practices. 9 4 This asymmetry is not surprising. Women were largely off
limits from the kind of public attacks leveled at men.95 They also appeared
infrequently in opinions discussing fraud or contract violations. 9 6 Once it entered
the law of slander, however, moral turpitude when applied to women was used
almost exclusively to signify breaches of sexual morality.97
Throughout the nineteenth century, courts reinforced the notion that moral
turpitude in men was characterized by oath-breaking and disloyalty but not
violence, while in women it connoted failure to comply with norms of sexual
conduct. An 1826 Pennsylvania defamation case is illustrative. The plaintiff, a
' Different norms applied to African Americans in slavery, both men and women,
and to Native Americans. For a nuanced discussion of racialized ideologies of virtue in the
nineteenth century, see Francois Furstenberg, Beyond Freedom and Slavery: Autonomy,
Virtue, and Resistance in Early American Political Discourse, 89 J. AM. HiST. 1295
(2003).
92 See Julia Simon-Kerr, Note, Unchaste and Incredible: The Use of Gendered
Conceptions ofHonor in Impeachment, 117 YALE L.J. 1854, 1862-64 (2008).
9 See id. at 1868-86.
94 A Westlaw search of cases in which moral turpitude and fraud or deception
appeared in the same paragraph produced 366 instances before 1900, whereas a search for
moral turpitude in the same paragraph as five words suggestive of sexual deviance, such as
chastity, fornication, and their variants, produces only 93 pre-1900 cases.
" FREEMAN, supra note 69, at 132 (explaining that the public perception that women
were defenseless led to the lack of public attacks on women because "there was no honor in
an unfair fight"). In one of the few published references to women and moral turpitude, an
anonymous writer ascribed Sparta's decline to the fact that "Spartan women became
remarkable for indecency, and every other species of moral turpitude." Female Education,
and the Duties of the Female Sex: No. IX, VT. INTELLIGENCER & BELLOW FALLS
ADVERTISER, July 14, 1817, at 2.
96 Although the influential English fraud case Haycraft v. Creasy, (1801)
102 Eng.
Rep. 303; 2 East 92, did have a woman at its center, she was not a party to the eventual
lawsuit. Id. at 303-04. The case had facts worthy of Trollope or Dickens: Miss Robertson,
a former school teacher, began to give "herself out to the world as a person of considerable
fortune." Id. at 304. She borrowed money based on that pretense and established herself
with a large house and a carriage, which only enabled her to borrow from more creditors.
Id. Among those who were taken in by her apparent wealth was the defendant, Creasy, a
currier who was in business near Miss Robertson's house and had loaned her E2000
without security. Id. He also made the mistake of assuring Haycraft, an ironmonger, that
Robertson was credit worthy. Id. at 304-05. Haycraft's suit was based on that assertion. Id.
at 304-05.
97 See infra text accompanying notes 126-136.
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man, had been accused of theft, and on the issue of damages the state's high court
stated that "[t]he condition, and even the sex of the parties, [must be]
considered."98 The court went on to observe that "the imputation of want of
chastity to a man is actionable; yet, unless under very particular circumstances,
only nominal damages would be given."9 9 On the other hand, an accusation of
want of chastity in a woman was presumed to cause great injury, although her
."condition in life" must be taken into account. 0 0
A concurring opinion in an 1840 slander case from Louisiana gave a more
pointed account of the distinction, while also expressing the view that moral
turpitude did not necessarily encompass male crimes of violence. The concurring
judge wrote:
I believe an action of slander can be, and ought sometimes to be
maintained, for words which do not charge an offence that will subject
the party to indictment. For instance, to charge a virtuous woman with a
want of chastity. On the other hand, there are words which impute
indictable offences that would not, in my estimation sustain an action for
slander: As to say of a man, he was guilty of an assault and battery, or
that he was the bearer of a challenge to fight a duel, or that he retailed
spirituous liquors without a license.'0 '
In other words, while violence in defense of a man's honor' 02 or a simple assault
did not violate honor norms so as to constitute moral turpitude, lack of chastity in a
woman did.
For people of either sex, as an attorney explained in one Kentucky case, acts
involving moral turpitude were set apart by the permanent harm they could inflict
upon reputation. "We estimate the character of a man by the uniform tenor of his
life," the attorney reasoned, and "there are particular acts of moral turpitude, the
commission of which, would be decisive of his infamy, and stamp an indelible
stigma on his reputation . . . ."tos With its clearly understood meaning and its
intimate connection with reputational harm, moral turpitude was thus a natural fit
for the law of defamation.

98

McAlmont v. McClelland, 14 Serg. & Rawle 359, 362 (Pa. 1826).

99 Id.
100Id

1o1Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 395, 406-07 (1840) (Garland, J., concurring).
102 The idea that fighting duels did not amount to moral turpitude appears
with some
regularity in an array of cases. For example, in a Virginia case involving the impeachment
of a notary public who had assisted at a duel, the court's analysis turned, in part, on its
observation that "the violation of the anti-dueling law ... [is] not supposed to involve so
great a degree of moral turpitude." Royall v. Thomas, 69 Va. 130, 134 (1877).
103 Johnson v. Moore's Heirs, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 371, 380 (1822).
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B. Moral Turpitude as Slander

By the late eighteenth century, England had established the rough principle
that spoken words that "impute that the plaintiff has been guilty of a crime
punishable with imprisonment" would be actionable without proof of damages.10 4
Still, the courts struggled to define the boundaries of this rule. Should a line be
drawn between felonies and misdemeanors? What should be done about crimes
punishable by hanging or by banishment? The early law of slander was, in part, a
replacement for an extralegal honor system that had dealt with insults and false
accusations through violence, often by dueling.' 05 But in seeking to curb private
violence, the courts ran the risk of opening themselves to a flood of litigation over
trivial grievances. In crafting a rule for slander per se, the courts sought to maintain
a balance between providing redress for severe reputational wrongs and permitting
litigants to bring their personal vendettas into court. 106 In the early nineteenth
century, however, that balancing act resulted in a "mass of conflicting
decisions." 0 7 When it turned to the challenge of framing a test for slander in the
new Republic, therefore, the nascent American legal system had unusual space to
invent a new rule for an old tort.
When the New York Supreme Court decided Brooker v. Coffin 08 in 1809, it
did just that. Drawing from the popular parlance of honor, it ruled that a crime
would be actionable as slander per se only if the words, if true, would result in
"indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or subject [the person] to an

4 ENCYCLOP/EDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 466 (A. Wood Renton & Max A.
Robertson, eds., 1907); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124
("[Slander] may endanger a man by subjecting him to the penalties of the law, may exclude
him from society, [or] may impair his trade.").
104

1o5

See

IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING

502 (1965)

(noting that the tort of slander emerged as "a substitute for the duel and a deterrent to
murder"); see also Mark M. Carroll, "All for Keeping His Own Negro Wench": Birch v.
Benton (1858) and the Politics of Slander and Free Speech in Antebellum Missouri, 29 L.

& HIST. REV. 835, 858 (2011) (noting that "an obstinate cult of masculine honor that
prevailed in both town and country," particularly in the South, required "common men and
politicians to respond to political insults with lethal violence" and contributed to a cultural
stigma against bringing slander actions); Alison L. LaCroix, To Gain the Whole World and
Lose His Own Soul: Nineteenth-Century American Dueling as Public Law and Private
Code, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501, 562 (2004) ("[L]ibel and slander law took up where the
duel left off in that they addressed the same basic need of the individual to avenge and

vindicate himself against a verbal attacker."). But cf James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility
and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279, 1375-79 (2000) (arguing that relative to

European countries, the United States had a weak honor culture that was not actualized in
the law, except to the extent necessary to prevent actual damage to reputation or business
interests).
106 See NEWELL & NEWELL, supra note 7, at 108.
07
1

id.

'os 5 Johns. 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
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infamous punishment."l 0 9 When it reframed the tort in terms of moral turpitude,
the cultural salience of the phrase was such that the court in Brooker did not
trouble to define it. Nor did it specify the basis for its holding that the prostitution
accusation did not qualify as slander per se under the new rule. Yet because
prostitution was universally understood to involve moral turpitude, later courts
read Brooker as turning on the fact that prostitution was not an indictable offense
in New York at that time."n0
Moral turpitude's function in the Brooker test was to track reputational injury,
a function that reflected its understood social meaning and the belief that there
were reputation-defining norms of conduct that courts could easily discern. True to
that understanding, courts routinely found that accusations of fraud, oath breaking,
and related crimes such as theft, as well as accusations of sexual deviance,
particularly by women, connoted moral turpitude. This consistency paralleled
cultural understandings of what acts would destroy a person's reputation. In the
early slander cases involving violations of core honor norms, moral turpitude was
thus superficially akin to the type of standard whose "content has not been
specified in advance"" but that provided guidelines for determining what would
fall within and without its bounds. Courts' approaches to moral turpitude in
borderline cases, however, show the error in that understanding. In marginal cases,
moral turpitude looked instead like a rule. It was a phrase with specific content that
offered little guidance on how to evaluate cases that fell at its margins. Without
that guidance, courts eschewed moral reasoning or speculation about community
mores and instead turned to familiar legal proxies such as malum in se or the
presence of evil intent, to resolve cases. That avoidance caused the moral turpitude
to solidify around its core content, while demarcating the legal term's boundaries
along lines that had nothing to do with the underlying legal question. A sampling
of the cases that followed Brooker illustrates the core stability of moral turpitude
and the courts' uses of blunt proxies in cases at the margins.
1. Moral Turpitude and Core Honor Norms

The early slander cases to some extent bear out the Brooker court's
assumption that accusations connoting moral turpitude could be recognized
without difficulty. As one nineteenth-century treatise writer explained, the courts
most commonly identified "breach[es] of honesty . . . and of chastity" as accu-

sations that would rise to the level of slander per se."l Accusations of crimes of
violence, by contrast, rarely appeared in slander cases applying the standard. The
moral turpitude standard thus enfolded into the law of slander commonly held
beliefs about moral rectitude. A man's honor depended on his integrity but was not
affected by his violence, while a woman's depended on her chastity. The courts
09
1

Id. at 191.
See infra Part I.B.1.
' Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1086.
11

112

1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS

277 (2d ed. 1861).
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applying the standard easily disposed of accusations that resonated with those core
norms. The cases that follow show the pattern.
An 1851 Iowa case involving the destruction of property, for example,
highlights the dichotomy between crimes of violence and crimes involving
financial wrongs. The plaintiff sued for defamation because he had been accused
of poisoning his neighbor's cow, and the trial court ruled that the accusation did
not qualify as slander per se.' 13 The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and
remanded, citing the Brooker rule.1 4 Cow poisoning, the court wrote, exhibits
"more moral turpitude" than do crimes of a "higher legal grade, and hence the
accusation of it may render a man more infamous in the estimation of the
public."'1" The court contrasted homicide, explaining that "many circumstances,"
such as the heat of passion, "may exist as palliations of moral guilt in the public
mind." 16 But, it concluded, "no circumstances can possibly extenuate the moral
turpitude of that wretch who will poison his neighbor's horse or cow."
The cow-poisoning argument may seem odd to the modern reader, but it was
likely an accurate reflection of cultural norms. Cows and horses were essential and
usually beloved means of livelihood in agricultural communities. At the same time,
violence, particularly in the South and West, was an acceptable tool for the defense
of male honor."' 8 Revenge killings were not uncommon and often seen as
justified." 9 Although the farming communities of Iowa were not the focal point for,
that vision of honor, it is still not surprising to see the court identify the destruction
of a neighbor's cow, and thereby his livelihood, as more clearly morally
problematic than his murder.' 20
In another example, a New Jersey court found that accusing a man of cheating
in his business would support slander liability, but accusing him of frequenting
prostitutes would not. The case involved accusations that the plaintiff was "a pretty
man, riding the women along the street," and that "[s]hort weights and measures"
had paid for his horse and other property "by cheating the public."' 2 1 The court
applied the moral turpitude standard to find that the latter accusation, but not the
former, constituted slander per se.122
113

Burton v. Burton, 3 Greene 316, 316-19 (Iowa 1851).

114 Id.

at 317-18.
u5 Id. at 318.
116

d

117 id.
" See RICHARD E. NESBETT &Dov COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE
PSYCHOLOGY
OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH
"9

Id.

8-9 (1996).

Although it did not make a similar contrast to murder, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia found, similarly, that "to call one a thief, to say of him, he stole my
sheep, or he stole sheep, are words which impute a punishable offence, and are actionable"
under the moral turpitude standard. Harman v. Cundiff, 82 Va. 239, 244 (1886).
ni Joralemon v. Pomeroy, 22 N.J.L. 271, 272 (1849) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
122 Id. at 276-77.
120
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Fraud and oath violations by men were routinely deemed to involve moral
turpitude. In 1853, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court easily found that an
accusation that an estate executor had both committed fraud and violated his oath
constituted slander per se. 123 Although the court insisted that the moral turpitude
standard depends on mores that can and do change,' 24 the court made no reference
to mores in resolving this case of alleged fraud by an estate fiduciary. It flatly
observed, "[h]ere the moral turpitude is very gross, consisting of a positive and
fraudulent breach of an official oath." 25
Accusations that women were prostitutes, committed adultery, or fornicated
outside of marriage, although they did not always support per se slander liability,
were almost invariably found to involve moral turpitude. As the Supreme Court of
the Territory of Iowa explained in 1844,
The reputation of a female for chastity, by the common consent of
mankind, is regarded with peculiar jealousy. The condition of women is,
therefore, as to this virtue, [that if an accusation that a woman is a
strumpet] were believed she would be excluded from society, and set
aside as infamous in the common sense of the term.' 2 6
Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that accusing a woman of
committing adultery constituted slander per se because the conduct involved moral
turpitude.1 27 "By the common law of this state," the court wrote, "words imputing
to a woman, whether she is married or single, a violation of chastity, are in
themselves actionable." 2 8 In 1891 the Vermont Supreme Court held that accusing
a woman of keeping a house of ill fame supported per se liability because the
conduct "involves moral turpitude and subjects the offender to imprisonment." 2 9
When the Supreme Court of the United States eventually applied the Brooker
rule in the District of Columbia, it did so in a case involving an accusation that a
woman had been in bed with a man who was not her husband.130 The Court made
Beck v. Stitzel, 21 Pa. 522 (1853).
Id. at 524 ("Th[e] element of moral turpitude is necessarily adaptive; for it is itself
defined by the state of public morals, and thus far fits the action to be at all times
accommodated to the common sense of the community.").
125 Id. at 525. Some early courts made a distinction between embezzlement and
"stealing and robbery" because "the latter imply a wrongful taking of another's goods, but
embezzlement denotes the wrongful appropriation and use of what came into possession
rightfully." Taylor v. Kneeland, 1 Doug. 67, 72 (Mich. 1843). That distinction does not
seem to have been widespread, and the Pennsylvania court does not mention it. But it
would appear again in the North Dakota statute that used moral turpitude as a standard
requiring sterilization of persons convicted of certain crimes. While larceny and other
forms of theft were included, embezzlement was not.
126 Cox v. Bunker, Morris 269, 270 (Iowa
1844).
123

124

127
128

129
130

Frisbie v. Fowler, 2 Conn. 707, 708 (1818).
Id

Posnett v. Marble, 20 A. 813, 816 (Vt. 1890).
Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1875).
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clear that the slander charge would fail because fornication was not an indictable
offense, not because it did not involve moral turpitude.131 In support of its dicta
that the moral turpitude requirement was met, the court pithily stated that accusing
a woman of fornication "[b]eyond all doubt" involves moral turpitude.' 32
Along the same lines, in 1895, the Supreme Court of Idaho explained that an
accusation of prostitution was not actionable because that offense was not
indictable in the state, while acknowledging the general consensus that such
conduct did involve moral turpitude.'33 The court noted that other states had
overcome that difficulty either by making "acts of unchastity indictable and
punishable as such, or [making] words imputing to a female want of chastity
actionable per se." 34 Yet, the court declined to add a category of per se slander by
judicial fiat. In the course of its opinion, the court echoed the reasoning of the Iowa
court in the cow-poisoning case. It noted that the closest indictable offense to
prostitution was vagrancy, but it explained:
[V]agrancy is not, in the sense in which it is generally used and accepted,
"a crime necessarily involving moral turpitude;" it is, perhaps, as often
the result of misfortune, or of unfortuitous social conditions, as of any
criminal or vicious acts or tendencies on the part of the person charged
therewith. '
Thus, although the court advanced the same kind of innocent explanation for
vagrancy that the Iowa court had offered for murder, it glossed over the possibility
that a similar justification might exist for prostitution. As in the cow-poisoning
case, the court suggested that certain actions were simply never justifiable under
prevailing codes of behavior.' 3 6
2. Moral Turpitude at the Margins

When cases fell within uncontroversial boundaries set by social convention,
moral turpitude was a serviceable standard for reputational injury. Cases at the
margins, however, were problematic. Those borderline cases, which did not
involve accusations resonating in fraud or unchastity, required that courts explain
potentially controversial decisions with more than cursory reasoning. That proved
so difficult that a few courts, notably in southern states, balked at adopting the
standard. Their opinions are instructive because they foreground the difficulty
courts faced when they sought to use moral turpitude as a guide rather than a label.
The two main cases in which courts rejected the moral turpitude standard both
involved accusations touching upon the question of slavery. In each case, the court
".'
Id. at 227-28.

132 Id. at 228.
1
Douglas v. Douglas, 38 P. 934, 934 (Idaho 1895).
134
'3
136

Id.
Id.
See id.
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made plain its distaste for the philosophical or sociological inquiries the moral
turpitude standard seemed to require. In one, an 1836 North Carolina case, the
plaintiff had been accused of harboring runaway slaves, an indictable offense in
North Carolina,' 3 7 and the issue before the court was whether the accusation
constituted slander per se.' 38 The court rejected the Brooker rule, preferring instead
an English common law rule that slander per se is found if the offending words, if
true, would subject their object to an infamous punishment at law.' 39 The court
viewed the English rule as clear and the Brooker rule as both unworkable and
beyond its competence.14 0 The moral turpitude standard, it wrote, would compel it
"to search moral and ethical authors, rather than legal writers, in order to ascertain
whether the case made be within the rule."' 4 1 Applying the English rule, the court
ruled that the accusation did not constitute slander per se.142
Similarly, in an 1858 case also touching on fraught issues of slavery, gender,
and antebellum politics,' 43 the Supreme Court of Missouri bluntly criticized the
moral turpitude standard on the ground that moral relativism made it
unworkable.144 A well-known Missouri Supreme Court judge had been accused by
a political rival-an abolitionist and pro-union Senator-of whipping his wife after
she accused him of having an affair with a slave.14 5 The judge responded with a
slander suit.' 4 6 The trial judge instructed the jury that the words were "actionable
of themselves," and the jury found for the judge.14 7 In its opinion reversing the
judgment, the supreme court acknowledged that the law of slander is designed to
protect "good name and reputation," and that wife-beating ought to "brand[] with
shame" the perpetrator. 4 8 Yet, the court reasoned that in the case of slander per se,
courts generally focus on the "penal nature of the offence imputed" rather than on
17

Skinner v. White, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 471, 472 (1836) (per curiam).

Id. at 472.
139 Id. at 473-74.
140 Id. at 474.
138

Id. The problematic nature of any searching moral or ethical analysis in cases
involving the crime of harboring runaway slaves is self-evident. See, e.g., Smith v.
Swormstedt, 22 F. Cas. 663, 680 (C.C.D. Ohio 1852) (noting there are people "who hold
that the ownership or holding of slaves, under any conceivable circumstances, involves
moral turpitude"), rev'd 57 U.S. 288 (1853).
142 Skinner, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) at 474-75.
143 See Carroll, supra note 105, at 884 (noting the dispute touched on domestic
matters as well as "the morality and social consequences of slavery, the prime political
controversy of the day").
'" Birch v. Benton, 26 Mo. 153, 159 (1858).
145 Carroll, supra note 105, at 835.
146 id.
141

147 Birch, 26

Mo.-at 158.
Id. For a detailed history of this case, see Carroll, supra note 105. Carroll argues
that while the courts sought a clear rule to govern slander cases, politicians and ordinary
citizens in the trans-Mississippi Southwest for much of the nineteenth century continued to
resolve the tension between protecting individual reputation and the imperatives of free
expression with self-help. See id.
148
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"the degree of discredit attached to the party." 4 9 It rejected the Brooker rule,
explaining that the rule "lack[ed] certainty" because "the terms 'moral turpitude'
and 'infamous' are of indefinite import."' 50 Shifting to the example of liquor
licensing laws, the court noted that differing views on the morality of selling liquor
would lead to differing views on whether violations of a licensing law constituted
moral turpitude. 15 Without popular consensus, using moral turpitude as a criterion
for liability would prove foolhardy.152 Accordingly, the court limited slander per se
liability to those who made an accusation of an "indictable offense for which
corporal punishment may be inflicted as the immediate punishment."' 5 3 Because
wife beating would not be punished corporally, the lower court's instruction to*the
jury that it would constitute slander per se was reversed as erroneous.154
The concerns articulated by these courts did not deter others from adopting
the standard, but they suggest why those courts sought ways to cabin their
inquiries to a realm perceived as legal, not moral. Courts-using the standard were
no more interested in resolving uncertainty by consulting works of moral
philosophy than were those that rejected the standard. Yet, those courts had to find
some way to manage the standard in borderline cases outside of the comfort zone
presented by accusations of fraud or unchastity.
In 1855, the Supreme Court of Tennessee turned to Webster's Dictionary
when confronted with a case involving an accusation that a man sold liquor to
slaves in violation of state law.'5 5 Unlike its two southern counterparts, the
Tennessee court adopted the Brooker test, which it viewed as the most "certain and
definite rule" available.' 5 6 In Webster's it found that "[m]oral turpitude is said to
imply 'inherent baseness or vileness of principle in the human heart; extreme
depravity."" 5 7 The court understood that definition in terms of prevailing social
norms. "It is easy to see," the court wrote, "that trespass, assault, battery, and the
like are not within the rule; while other misdemeanors, which imply extreme
baseness and depravity of heart, are properly included."' 5 8 True to the predominant
honor codes, the court listed bribery, extortion, theft, keeping a bawdy house and
offenses involving financial corruption as among those misdemeanors that did

149 Birch, 26 Mo. at 159.

i5o Id.
'5' Id.
15 2 id.

' Id. at 159-60.

154 Id. at 158.

155 Smith v. Smith, 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 473, 479 (1855). The court was forced to
consult Webster's because in 1855 no law treatise or law dictionary included an entry for

"moral turpitude." Its citation of Webster's provided a lasting definition that could be and
often was quoted in cases necessitating a moral turpitude analysis. Eventually, it was
incorporated almost verbatim into law treatises.
156 id.
157 Id.
158sid.
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suggest extreme depravity.' 59 Yet, when it came to the actual crime at issue, the
offense of selling liquor to slaves, the court abandoned both the dictionary and the
idea of reinforcement through cultural allusion. Instead, the court flatly opined that
the "moral grade" of the offense "is odious, and . . . involves the highest degree of
moral turpitude."' 6 0
The Webster's definition of moral turpitude would provide subsequent courts
with a helpful rote formulation, but those courts were as uninterested as the
Tennessee court in attempting to tease out the contours of vileness and depravity.
Instead, in borderline cases, most courts eventually settled on one of two common
law proxies for moral turpitude, both of which sidestepped the definition and any
analysis of social disapprobation or reputational harm. One proxy conflated moral
turpitude with infamous crimes or crimes and misconduct deemed malum in se.161
A second understood the standard in terms of conduct involving evil intent or
scienter.
A case decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1839 provides an early
example of the use of the two- doctrinal proxies that would come to predominate in
later opinions. The suit was a slander action brought by a postmaster accused of
opening letters before delivering them.' 6 2 The majority concluded that the
accusation imputed an indictable offense but expressly held that the words failed to
meet the moral turpitude prong of the tort as defined in Brooker.16 Although it
viewed the Brooker rule as "expressed with precision," the court focused on the
idea of "immoral intent" when it applied the rule.1' 6 4 Reasoning that some
"fraudulent intent, or corrupt design" was required to "impute[] a want of
integrity,"'6 5 the court could find no such design in the naked charge of
159

Id. at 479-80.
48 1.

160 Id. at
161 That

conflation was not without logic. Like moral turpitude, malum in se crimes
and infamous crimes were fuzzy standards that were at times defined with reference to
natural law concepts of moral right and wrong. See Reuben Oppenheimer, Infamous
Crimes and the Moreland Case, 36 HARV. L. REv. 299, 300-01 (1923); Nancy Travis
Wolfe, Mala in Se: A DisappearingDoctrine? 19 CRIMINOLOGY 131, 139-40 (1981);
Note, The Distinction Between Mala Prohibita and Mala in Se in Criminal Law, 30

COLUM. L. REV. 74, 83 (1930). Yet, both standards derived from English common law and
could be given more fixed meanings. In early cases, for example, malum in se crimes were
almost invariably identified simply as crimes that had been criminalized at common law.
See, e.g., People v. Maxon, 1 Idaho 330, 344 (1870) (identifying two classes of
misdemeanors: (1) "mala in se, or penal at the common law" and (2) "mala prohibita, or
penal by statute") (citing I FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 2 (1846)). Courts dealing with the question whether crime or punishment
was "infamous," in turn, often resorted to a stock list of punishments or crimes. For
example, the Supreme Court held that crimes "punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary" were infamous. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 354 (1886).
162 McCuen v. Ludlum, 17 N.J.L. 12 (1839).
161

Id. at 18-20.

" Id. at 18-19.

165

Id. at 19.
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letter-opening. 166 In its view, the charge might signify impropriety, but it "d[id] not
necessarily imply that it was done with an immoral intent, with a.design to commit
.a fraud or criminal wrong to the party."' 67 The majority thus fell back on scienter, a
preexisting legal concept related to questions of morality. The presence or absence
of scienter would allow the court to differentiate between a violation of "one of the
proprieties of conventional life" and the violation of a "moral duty."l 68
The court's analysis suggested, unoriginally, that moral wrongfulness was
entwined with intentionality. That formulation had deep roots in the criminal law,
which demanded proof of mens rea to show the moral blameworthiness that would
justify punishment.' 69 In tort law as well, the presence or absence of intent had
long formed a boundary between innocent conduct that resulted in loss of property
to another and actionable fraud. 70 Indeed, in eighteenth-century English fraud
cases, courts used the phrase moral turpitude descriptively -to mark the difference
between intentional and unintentional fraud when determining liability.17' In
turning to evil intent as a signal of moral turpitude, the New Jersey majority thus
used a familiar equation. At the same time, it deflected the inquiry from the harm
to reputation at the core of the slander per se issue, avoiding a more contextual
inquiry into community mores.
The scienter standard would eventually predominate in moral turpitude
jurisprudence, but it was by no means the prevailing approach when the New
Jersey case was decided. The concurring opinion in that case presented another
approach. In it, the chief justice invoked the well-established, though also vexing,
distinction between crimes deemed malum in se and crimes that are malum
66

Id
Id.
168 id.
161 See, e.g., 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 37 ("[I]ntent is a sine qua non of
criminal
responsibility; generally, in every crime there must exist a union or joint operation of act or
67

conduct and criminal intent or criminal negligence.").

170 See, e.g., JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS § 148, at 417 (1st ed.
1907) (describing deceit as "making a willfully false statement with the intent that the

plaintiff shall act in reliance on it, and with the result that he does so act and suffers harm
in consequence. The false statement may be made either by words or by conduct").
171

The phrase moral turpitude was already used at times in contract cases as a

descriptive term for the kind of exchange that would invalidate a contract. This usage was
tied to the Roman codes in which turpis causa was a way to delimit the enforceability of
contracts. See, e.g., JOSEPH R. LONG, NOTES ON ROMAN LAW § 71, at 52 (1912) ("A
contract induced by an illegal consideration (injusta or turpis causa) was not enforceable,
even though the thing promised was itself lawful."). In an echo of its Roman roots, the

moral turpitude descriptor appeared most often in contract and certain fraud actions to
express a conclusion about subjective intent. See, e.g., Yates v. Foot, 12 Johns. 1, 4 (N.Y.

1814); Bayard v. Malcolm, 2 Johns. 550, 553 (N.Y. 1807); Munro v. Gardner, 6 S.C.L. (1
Tread.) 1, 10 (S.C. 1812). Moral turpitude also appears in English cases during the same
period. In 1801, for example, Lord Kenyon used the term in an influential dissent in an
action for damages based on fraud. See Haycraft v. Creasy, (1801) 102 Eng. Rep. 303; 2
East 92.
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prohibitum.17 2 The chief justice argued that even if the conduct were a statutory
crime, an accusation of opening the mail would not amount to slander. 173 His
formulation of the test was straightforward. Because opening someone else's
letters was not "criminal in itself," or malum in se, the chief justice reasoned, the
accusation could not constitute slander per se.174
As these cases show, when courts confronted borderline questions, they
resorted to familiar doctrines and steered clear of the amorphous realm of moral
wrongfulness and social disapprobation. The honor code, while it clearly
condemned certain activities like intentional fraud or prostitution, was less clear
when it came to behavior like unauthorized letter-opening, where motive and
social class both played important roles in how the offense would be perceived.
Similarly, cases that touched upon slavery placed particular pressure on a standard
that makes an explicit call for moral judgments. Although resort to pre-existing
legal standards begged the reputational injury question, the older doctrines offered
a clear way to deal with a rule that might have required the courts to don their
philosophers' garb.
The result for slander law was not particularly problematic. Some fuzziness at
the margins is the expected byproduct of any rule applied to distinct sets of facts.175
In the context of defamation litigation, the harm of under- or over-inclusiveness in
the application of the rule was relatively slight, requiring that a defendant pay
undeserved damages or that a plaintiff forgo deserved compensation for
reputational injury. And for much of the nineteenth century, cases at the margins
were relatively infrequent.
With the wave of morals legislation in the later nineteenth century, however,
more pressure was placed on the standard. By that time, the phrase had moved
from the law of slander into other legal areas in which its potential for harm was
greater. In conjunction with the social upheaval worked by the Civil War and
changes in popular mores, both the persistence of the core honor code in moral
turpitude jurisprudence and the way that courts addressed cases on its margins
became increasingly problematic.
II. MORAL TURPITUDE AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
As courts worked to formalize the definition of slander per se, they also
grappled with unsettled questions in the area of evidence, such as whether and
under what circumstances witnesses could be impeached, disqualified, or
rehabilitated, and how that evidence would be introduced. Impeachment
jurisprudence, like the law of slander, developed in the shadow of nineteenthcentury honor norms.17 6 Those norms informed the early consensus that evidence
172

173

McCuen, 17 N.J.L. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.

174 Id. at
175
176

17.

See, e.g., Hart, supra note 13, at 607.
See Simon-Kerr, supra note 92, at 1874-79.
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of a person's reputation was relevant to his or her credibility and could also be
used to impeach or rehabilitate a witness's character.177 Acts that would destroy a
witness's reputation, the logic went, would also impair his credibility. The
question of credibility, therefore, could be addressed by admitting evidence of
reputation.
Extending that logic, attorneys argued that evidence of a witness's acts
involving moral turpitude were relevant to his or her credibility because such
evidence was "decisive of . .. infamy," stamping an indelible mark on a person's
reputation.17 8 By the late nineteenth century, courts in states ranging from
Alabama, Georgia, Texas, and California to Connecticut, Vermont, and Maine had
all agreed that moral turpitude and credibility were related.17 9 Accordingly, all had
endorsed formal rules permitting evidence of crimes or acts involving moral
turpitude for impeachment or had found that the introduction of such evidence
would justify the rehabilitation of a witness's credibility. 80 Courts applied the
standard in this context in much the same way as they had in defamation cases.
Although it was now used to identify evidence relevant to credibility rather than to
approximate reputational harm, courts faced with marginal cases did not look to
the underlying credibility issue. Instead, they drew upon the same proxies they had
resorted to in slander cases. Those proxies, in turn, allowed courts to make
legalistic rather than moralistic detenminations about whether the standard applied.
Yet, in contrast to its arguable efficacy in slander law, moral turpitude proved
an uneasy fit as a standard for impeachment evidence. Although character and
reputation were equated through impeachment rules, many courts questioned the
notion that all actions that would destroy a person's general reputation would also
destroy his or her character for truthfulness. As a path-breaking article on
defamation described the issue, there is a difference between "[c]haracter," which
"is what a person really is," and "reputation," which "is what he seems to be."' 8 '
Crafting a rule to identify damage to the latter in the law of slander had led courts
to moral turpitude. But the many courts to examine moral turpitude as an
evidentiary standard acknowledged that the term was better suited to understanding
"the character imputed to [a person] by others" rather than to assessing the
"principles and motives-be they known or unknown-which govern [a person's]
conduct."' 82
Despite these concerns, for nearly a century, moral turpitude played a
significant role in evidentiary decisions. As courts used the standard to admit or
exclude evidence, they continued to hew to core cultural meanings and, at the
margins, to avoid the moral imperative of the standard by resorting to doctrinal
17

See id. at 1868-84 (showing evidence of attempted impeachment of women with

evidence of their unchastity).
178

Johnson v. Moore's Heirs, 11 Ky. (1Litt.) 371, 380 (1822).

See infra Part IIA-B.
so See infra Part II.A-B.
181 Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation,
4
COLUM. L. REv. 33, 33 (1904).
182 id.
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proxies. Eventually, however, as evidentiary rules matured and became
rationalized, courts criticized the standard as indeterminate and unhelpful.
Following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, most states abandoned
moral turpitude as an evidence standard. Even so, the allure of moral turpitude
remains. Courts in California and Texas still hold to it as a guide to credibility. 83
A. Moral Turpitude Impeachment and Core Honor Norms
In the 1838 New York case that marks the first discussion of moral turpitude
in the law of evidence, the court recognized the problematic nature of moral
turpitude evidence even as it ratified its use.184 The case was a manslaughter
prosecution.' 8 5 A defense witness, Mr. Gillespie, had been an eyewitness to the
fight that led to the criminal charge.186 Gillespie acknowledged that he frequented
bars, had been unemployed for the last two years, had lived in an adulterous
relationship surviving off of his savings, and would have been destitute had he
paid his debts.' 87 The trial court disallowed testimony offered by the defense to
rehabilitate Gillespie, finding that his character for truth had not been
impeached. 88 In its opinion reversing the trial court, the New York Supreme Court
drew a link between general reputational damage and credibility, using moral
turpitude as the linchpin.' 8 1 If a witness "make[s] disclosures showing his moral
turpitude," the court explained, "[counsel] may insist upon it as destroying his
character, and therefore taking away his credit with the jury."' 90
Financial irresponsibility was a core departure from honor norms that was
only worsened when coupled with open adultery and a fondness for alcohol.
Accordingly, the court had no difficulty viewing the evidence as involving moral
turpitude and therefore likely to damage Gillespie's credibility. At the same time, it
was skeptical that such evidence was predictive of his truthfulness.'91 The court
rejected the idea that there was an inexorable link between what in modem
parlance would be a bad credit rating and the ability to tell the truth. Reflecting an
approach to witness impeachment that would predominate by the late twentieth
century, the court observed that even a wastrel can be a truth-teller.19 2 It wrote:
[Gillespie] had for some time led an idle and intemperate life, the inmate
of porter houses at hours unseasonably late. He had for two years been
wasting his means in a course of adulterous lewdness, alienated from his
See infra Part II.C.
184 People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
' Id.at 573, 592.
186 Id at 573.
181 Id. at 573-74.
18 Id. at 574.
189 Id. at 581.
190 d.
183

''

Id. at 586.
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family, unjust to them and to his creditors. Contrast a man embarked in
such vicious courses, not yet shown to be attended by one redeeming
virtue, with any reputable citizen, on a contradiction of fact before a jury,
could they hesitate between the two characters? Yet these vices and more
may abound in a character distinguished for an unyielding attachment to
truth. 93
In the court's view, while moral turpitude was congruent with reputational
damage, it was not necessarily congruent with dishonesty or, indeed, with any
attributes other than the ones named.194
Despite the skepticism expressed in this and other early cases, moral turpitude
eventually became formalized as an evidentiary standard.' 9 5 In this role, moral
turpitude followed the same trajectory that had developed in slander law. Gendered
honor norms, not surprisingly, were easily projected through the standard. The link
between a reputation for sexual virtue and ideas of female honor was culturally
powerful, and attorneys in nineteenth-century cases routinely attempted to impeach
the credibility of female witnesses with evidence of their lack of chastity.'9 6 For
example, the Vermont Supreme Court considered a jury charge governing
testimony by several female witnesses about their reasons for going to an alleged
house of prostitution.' 97 The court approved the charge, which stated that "the
character as to chastity of the witnesses is for you to consider in weighing their
evidence as given in court."' 9 8 In the same case, the court found that a woman
could be impeached with evidence that she had been convicted of stealing and
obtaining money on false pretenses: "The fact that the witness, on her plea of
guilty, had several times been convicted of such an offense can hardly be said to be
immaterial. It involved moral turpitude and affected her credibility."' 9 9
At the same time, crimes by men involving violence continued to be
exempted from moral turpitude's ambit. For example, in Texas, where the courts
developed a rule disallowing impeachment with "convictions for misdemeanors

193

Id.

194 Courts in other states initially shared the view that a witness could be rehabilitated

after the introduction of evidence of moral turpitude. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Walker, 29 Ga.
266, 268 (1859) (finding that if a witness disclosed "an act which exhibits moral turpitude
in himself [(in this case, forgery)], especially such an act as falls under the denomination of

crimen falsi," the court would be justified in giving the jury an instruction that they should
decide how far the act impaired the witness's credibility).
195 See, e.g., H. C. Underhill, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 245,
at 445 (2d ed. 1898) ("The modem rule is that the conviction . .. of a crime involving great
moral turpitude, may be proved to impeach the credibility of the witness.").
196 See Simon-Kerr, supra note 92, at 1864-65. By the early twentieth century, most
courts had rejected this connection in all but rape cases. Id. at 1886-93.
197 State v. Guyer, 100 A. 113, 115 (Vt. 1917).
198
9

Id.
Id. at 114.
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which do not involve moral turpitude," 200 the court of appeals found that a male
witness's assault conviction should be excluded. In that case, the court considered
testimony by a witness who had been convicted for assault and battery and
carrying a firearm. 20' The court explained that these convictions did not qualify
because they do not "show that [the witness] was lacking in integrity,-in other
words, that he was not a person worthy to be believed on his oath."202 Similarly,
the Wyoming Supreme Court held that a conviction for carrying a concealed
firearm, a misdemeanor, did not "tend to prove moral turpitude" or "lack of
veracity" on the part of a male witness. 203 The court therefore excluded the
evidence without deciding whether the state's rule limited impeachment to
evidence going directly to veracity or to moral turpitude more generally. 20 4 As in
the law of slander, the moral turpitude standard carried with it the implication that
being an honorable man at times required violence.
The failure to pursue honest work or financial misbehavior, however minor,
was viewed differently. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals observed in one
impeachment case that being a man who "follows some disreputable vocation or
calling for a living" is not presumed to be "as capable of telling the truth as one
who pursues some legitimate or honorable vocation."205 In 1893, the Georgia
Supreme Court ruled that "the fact that a witness has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude is admissible for the purpose of discrediting his
evidence." 206 Accordingly, the court found that a witness could be impeached with
evidence that he had been convicted of simple larceny.207 The court provided no
rationale for its apparent conclusion that the crime involved moral turpitude, most
probably because this crime involving property theft was viewed as a breach of
core honor norms.
Thus, the conventional boundaries of moral turpitude reproduced themselves
in the law of evidence. The standard continued to be applied in this way even by
courts that, under a relevance standard, recognized that conduct associated with
moral turpitude did not bear on credibility. One striking example is the use of
evidence of unchastity to impeach female witnesses. By the early twentieth
century, courts in almost every jurisdiction had refused to admit evidence of a
woman's unchastity for the purpose of impeaching her credibility on the grounds
that such evidence was irrelevant.208 When courts employed the moral turpitude
standard rather than asking the credibility question directly, however, the result
200
201

202
203

Brittain v. State, 37 S.W. 758, 758-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896).
id
Id. at 759.

Eads v. State, 101 P. 946, 951 (Wyo. 1909).

204

205
206
207

Curtis v. State, 81 S.W. 29, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1904).
Ford v. State, 17 S.E. 667, 667 (Ga. 1893).
id

See Simon-Kerr, supra note 92, at 1864-65. The exception was rape cases, where
courts continued to admit unchastity evidence, in part because they perceived it to be
relevant on the question of consent. Id. at 1886-93.
208
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was different, and moral turpitude evidence continued to be admitted to impeach
female witnesses.20 9 Whether a crime involved moral turpitude was simply not a
question that prompted courts to assess the underlying legal reason the question
was being asked. Instead, whether in defamation or evidence, moral turpitude was
moral turpitude. The courts applied the standard with reference to itself. Thus,
evidence of a woman's lack of sexual virtue or of a man's disreputable habits, such
as his gambling or his failure to maintain financial stability, were accepted as valid
impeachment material.2 10
B. Moral Turpitude Impeachment at the Margins

Just as they had in the law of slander, courts applying the standard in the
impeachment context struggled with cases at the margins. In these borderline cases
that might have offered courts the chance to rethink the standard's efficacy, moral
turpitude instead prompted many courts to fall back on a scienter analysis or on
other proxies such as the malum in se doctrine. These devices were ill suited to
credibility determinations. On the issue of what information would likely discredit
the witness, the malum in se equation was most clearly problematic. Taking the
logic of the equation to its natural extension, a witness's illegal activity would not
be presumed to involve moral turpitude and thus impair his or her credibility
unless the act was a crime at common law. And conversely, any common law
crime could be used to impeach a witness's credibility. Similarly, the requirement
that a crime involve evil intent to be relevant to a person's credibility meant that
much evidence of law-breaking would be excluded as irrelevant and that courts
might need to hold extensive hearings on the collateral issue of impeachment to
determine whether a particular crime met the requisite level of intent. Given these
problems, it is not surprising that courts failed to apply these doctrinal proxies
consistently.
For example, Vermont courts, interpreting a statute permitting impeachment
with crimes involving moral turpitude,211 adopted the malum in se formula.2 12
209

210

id.
See, e.g., Vause v. United States, 53 F.2d 346, 351 (1931) (impeaching a

government witness with evidence that he "was known to be a man who could and would
indulge in trickery and fraudulent financial schemes, and was an ex-convict because of his
previous practices in that regard"); State v. Williams, 87 S.W.2d 175, 182 (Mo. 1935)
(citing 70 CORPUS JURIS § 1069 (William Mack & Donald J. Kiser eds., 1935)) ("[T]here
are cases indicating a view that a man may bear a bad reputation for honesty, although not
considered untruthful, as where he fails to pay his debts, or is a sharp trader, and the like.").
211 See 7 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EVIDENCE 209 n.25 (Edgar W. Camp & John F.
Crowe eds., 1905) (citing VT. STAT. 1894 § 1245). This statute "was enacted to remove a
common-law disability or incompetency," but at the same time, the Vermont Supreme
Court noted, "it ma[de] it a matter of legal right to attack the credibility of a witness by
showing by independent evidence that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude." McGovern v. Smith, 53 A. 326, 327 (Vt. 1902).
212

See McGovern, 53 A. at 327-28.
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Nevertheless, in the first case to reach the state's supreme court under the statute,
the court concluded that a witness could be impeached with evidence that he had
sold illegal liquor. 2 13 Although the court acknowledged that the alcohol offense did
not "in .legal sense, involve moral turpitude,"2 14 it found that the evidence was
admissible.2 15
Connecticut courts provided a variation on the same theme. In a 1920 case
defining moral turpitude in terms of scienter, the court stated that for a crime to
"carry with it the germs of moral turpitude," it must involve "[i]ntentional wrong
or improper purpose." 2 16 Yet, as in Vermont, when prohibition violations by a
witness were at issue, the court ignored its own scienter test. In order to find that
liquor law violations involved moral turpitude, the court resorted to the U.S.
Constitution itself, explaining that disregard for liquor laws exhibited "baseness"
and was "destructive of the people's regard for the law of the land." 2 17
By contrast, in Maine, fifteen years after the repeal of prohibition, the state
supreme court again used the malum in se proxy to bolster its holding that liquor
law violations were not morally suspect and that therefore it was error to permit a
witness to be impeached with such evidence.2 1 8 But even though the malum in se
formulation provided the court with the outcome it sought, it was not entirely
satisfied with that analysis. It offered two other rationales for the finding that
liquor law violations did not satisfy the standard. First, the court wrote, "a
conviction does not show moral turpitude when the offense is such that a majority
of good citizens would not so consider it, even though other good citizens, with
minority ideas of reform, might positively affirm its existence." 2 19 And for good
measure, the court tacked on a bit of history, noting that at common law,
"[i]ntoxicating liquor was freely sold, and it was not considered morally wrong, by
our Colonial ancestors." 220
Courts also blatantly ignored their own proxies when core cases arose. In
Alabama, for example, the courts routinely used the malum in se/malum
prohibitum proxy to find that crimes that were not criminalized at common law,
such as gambling and alcohol offenses, did not involve moral turpitude.2 2 1 Yet,
213

2 14

id.
Id. at 327.

215 I[d.

Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 111 A. 861, 863 (Conn. 1920).
217 Kurtz v. Farrington, 132 A. 540, 542 (Conn. 1926).
218 State v. Jenness, 62 A.2d 867, 869 (Me. 1948).
2
216

1

9 id.

220

Id. The Supreme Court of Alabama offered a similar rationale for finding that drug

offenses, or at least a conviction for selling cocaine, did not involve moral turpitude. Pippin
v. State, 73 So. 340, 342 (Ala. 1916) ("[W]e do not think that the offense of selling cocaine
involves moral turpitude. This is a statutory crime, not punishable at common law. It is of
the description mala prohibita, as there is no inherent immorality in such acts, and its
illegality lies only in the fact of being prohibited.")
221 See, e.g., Exparte Marshall, 93 So. 471, 471-72 (Ala. 1922) (holding that because
for an act to involve moral turpitude it must "itself be inherently immoral," it was improper
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Alabama courts routinely found that sex crimes involved moral turpitude, even
though crimes such as statutory rape had not been prohibited at common law. 2 2 2
Some states avoided the problem of justifying, fudging, or ignoring proxies
for moral turpitude by refusing to define the term at all. In Georgia, for example,
the courts retained total freedom to interpret moral turpitude in any way they saw
fit.2 2 3 In a case upholding an unusual decision to permit the impeachment of a
witness with evidence of a conviction for assault with intent to kill, a Georgia
appellate court indicated that moral turpitude was a self-evident term.2 2 4 "[Tlhe
term 'moral turpitude,"' it declared, "is one of such obvious significance that it [is]
not incumbent on the judge, in the absence of a written request, to define it [when
charging the jury]."22 5
Even as they used moral turpitude increasingly in evidence jurisprudence,
many state courts acknowledged that the standard was problematic. For example,
for a witness to be impeached with evidence that he had been convicted of "making
liquor"); Moses v. Alabama, 58 Ala. 117, 120 (1877) (holding that evidence of a conviction
for illegal gambling was not admissible for impeachment because it was not malum in se
and therefore the crime did not involve moral turpitude).
222 Alabama courts found that the increasing list of crimes involving sexual behavior
involved moral turpitude. In 1974, for example, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided that
a man on trial for rape could be impeached with evidence that he had a prior statutory rape
conviction. Powell v. Alabama, 297 So. 2d 163, 167 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974). The court
asserted that statutory rape undoubtedly involved moral turpitude even though it had not
been a crime at common law. Statutory rape laws, declared the court, were meant "to
protect young girls . . . from falling victims to the wiles, schemes, debasedness, and
depravity of over-sexed men . . . who have lost their moral values." Id. The court

concluded that "all sex crimes are heinous, infamous and reprehensible." Id. at 168.
223 See Perren v. State, 25 S.E.2d 823, 825
(Ga. Ct. App. 1943).
224 Id.
225 Id. Georgia's concern with leaving moral turpitude
indefinite may have been
motivated by its widespread use of the term in disenfranchisement and juror
disqualification, where-as described in Part III.A and supra note 4, respectively-its
amorphousness served the purpose of permitting far-reaching control over the franchise
and jury pools. Georgia also treated liquor law convictions as not involving moral
turpitude, and thus impermissible for use in impeachment. Wheeler v. State, 61 S.E. 409,
409 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908). But see Moulder v. State, 71 S.E. 682, 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911)
(holding that a witness could be questioned about the defendant's reputation for selling
liquor illegally). Tennessee also took an expansive approach to the use of moral turpitude
in impeachment. See, e.g., Posley v. Tennessee, 288 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tenn. 1956)
(describing as settled the rule that "as to questions relating to indictments for offenses
involving moral turpitude, the cases permit them to be asked about"); Zanone v. Tennessee,
36 S.W. 711, 714-15 (Tenn. 1896). In an 1896 case showing the court's preoccupation
with prevailing honor norms, the court reversed a murder conviction due to the trial court's
decision to exclude testimony showing the moral turpitude of one of the state's witnesses.
The witness had married another state witness while that witness was married to someone
else. He had then been indicted, presumably for bigamy. See Zanone, 36 S.W. at 714-15.
The court also chided the trial court for excluding testimony from another state's witness to
the effect that she had lived in a bawdy house from a young age. Id.
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the Maine court in the liquor law violation case wrote, "It is well recognized that
moral turpitude cannot be exactly defined by a rule to fit all cases. It may be or
may not be said to exist, depending on the facts, conditions and circumstances. "226
Rather than adapting to "the facts, conditions and circumstances" of each
individual case, however, moral turpitude steered judges away from the underlying
legal question: credibility. Their attempts to steer back to the issue in uncertain
cases created a largely incoherent body of law riddled with unexplained exceptions
to unexplained rules.
C. Toward a New CredibilityStandard
It is no surprise that as evidence law became increasingly rationalized and
preoccupied with efficiency, 2 27 courts began to question and eventually to abandon
the moral turpitude standard. Impeachment issues are collateral issues at trial.
Moral turpitude could and often did mire courts in a definitional morass, and the
old common law categories did not solve the problem. In 1965, the Connecticut
Supreme Court abandoned the standard in an opinion that summed up its
failings. 228 According to the court, the moral turpitude standard had caused "not
inconsiderable" difficulties for trial judges, "especially in the case of mala
prohibita."229 Noting the "uncertainty in the meaning and application of the
phrase," the court. found that "a definite rule, of certain application, would
eliminate problems and difficulties at the trial level . . . which in turn lead to

mistakes and costly appellate procedure, if not to actual injustice.",230 In its place,
the court announced a bright line rule that witnesses could be impeached with
evidence of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one year, regardless
of the "presence or absence of moral turpitude."2 3 1
Similarly, in 1967, the Kansas Supreme Court wrote that while "[s]ome states
have adopted the rule that crimes involving moral turpitude are worthy of testing
credibility," the term has "a vague and uncertain meaning which plagues the
courts." 23 2 The court clarified that the state's recently codified impeachment rule,
which restricted impeachment to crimes "involving dishonesty or false statement,"
did not permit using moral turpitude as a determinant for what crimes would
qualify under that rule. 233 In 1975, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected a claim that
State v. Jenness, 62 A.2d 867, 869 (Me. 1948).
This move towards rationalization and efficiency culminated with the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. Rule 102, for example, read in part, "These rules
shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence." FED. R.
EVID. 102 (1975).
228 Heating Acceptance Corp. v. Patterson, 208 A.2d 341, 343-44 (Conn. 1965).
226
227

229
230

id
Id.

231 I[d.
232 Tucker
233

v. Lower, 434 P.2d 320, 324 (Kan. 1967).
Id. at 323-24.
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the state's evidence rule, enacted in 1861, had "'restrict[ed] the scope of
impeachment' . . . to the conviction of crimes involving 'moral turpitude."' 234 In so
doing, the court reasoned that the legislature would not have meant to incorporate a
standard that had led to "considerable uncertainty" and been "the subject of
considerable criticism." 2 35
The Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted by Congress in 1975, did not include
or even mention the standard. 236 Rule 608(a) provided that character or reputation
evidence could be used to attack witness credibility, but only if the evidence
referred to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.237 Rule 609, which covered
impeachment with criminal convictions, provided that a witness could be
impeached, subject to a balancing test, with evidence that he or she had been
convicted of a crime punishable by death or a prison sentence in excess of one
year. 238 The Rule also provided that a court had no discretion to exclude evidence
of a witness's conviction of a crime that "involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment." 23 9
Although there is no discussion of the standard in the advisory committee
report,24 0 the congressional debate suggests that some legislators were drawn to the
idea that credibility should be judged based on the perceived moral iniquity of a
criminal conviction. 241 For example, one congressman suggested that the moral
value of the crime committed, rather than the severity of the crime, should be
indicative of the moral worth of the witness and thereby his or her credibility. 24 2
He offered the hypothetical of "malicious destruction of public property," a crime
which, he argued, showed more about a person's "moral worth" and thus
credibility than would a conviction for theft. 24 3 Despite such arguments, Rule 609
eschewed any explicit reference to moral judgment, instead settling on allowing

234
235

Smith v. Durant, 534 P.2d 955, 961 (Or. 1975) (en banc).

Id. at 960.

This omission was not the product of haste or inattention. The Federal Rules were
adopted after a deliberative process that involved seven years of drafting by an expert
advisory committee, the contributions of legal scholars, and extensive congressional
intervention and debate during the three-year period between their introduction and
236

passage. See, e.g., Paul F. Rothstein, The ProposedAmendments to the Federal Rules of

Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 125-27 (1973) (describing committee established to write
proposed rules and commenting on amendments proposed by Congress in 1973, two years
prior to their eventual enactment).
237 FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (1975).
238 FED. R. EVID.
609.
239 FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
240 FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee notes, 1972 Proposed Rules.
241 120 CONG. REC. 2376 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hogan); see also Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 522 n.27 (1989) (quoting Rep. Hogan).
242 120 CONG. REC. 2376 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hogan).
243 Id. ("Personally I am more concerned about the moral worth of individuals capable
of engaging in such outrageous acts as adversely reflecting on a witness' character than I
am of thieves. . . .").
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evidence of felonies and crimes that "involved dishonesty or false statement,"
terms that shifted the focus of the inquiry from morality to credibility. 2 4 4
Courts applying Rule 609 highlighted the fact-specific nature of the inquiry
into prior crimes called for by the "dishonesty and false statement" provision.
Although there was controversy over the practice, most courts interpreted the rule
to permit them to look at the evidence underlying a witness's conviction to
determine whether it qualified.245 In the most recent amendment to the Federal
Rules, in 2006, the committee, chaired by then-Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,
affirmed that Rule 609 permits an inquiry into the facts of prior crimes in order for
courts to make a judgment about whether those crimes involved dishonesty. 2 46
Rule 609 currently states that evidence of a crime must be admitted if "the court
can readily determine that establishing . the elements of the crime required
proving-r the witness's admitting-a dishonest act or false statement."24 7
A majority of states have now embraced the approach of the Federal Rules,
either by adopting mirror rules or through judicial opinions. 24 8 In Tennessee, for
example, one year after the Federal Rules were adopted, the state's high court
confronted the issue of impeaching a defendant with evidence that he had been
Id.; see also Rules of Evidence: Hearing Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of
Fed. Criminal Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong. 251 (1973) [hereinafter
Hearings] (exchange between Rep. Dennis and C.J. Friendly on Rule 609).
244

Mr. Dennis: ... [I]f we are going to have a code and if we are going to try
to reform things in it, this particular rule would be a place where some
legitimate reform might be accomplished .

.

. by limiting the requirement to

offenses that have some logical bearing on credibility ....
Judge Friendly: I think I once took that view, but do you really think if you
were on a jury, you would not like to know if the witness had committed a
murder[?]. I think I would like to know.
Hearings,supra.
245 See REPORT OF

THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES

§ 11.4, at 7 (May
16, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/
ResearchingRules/Reports.aspx (describing the conflict in the courts over whether to look
solely at the elements of the conviction and noting that most courts "look behind the
conviction to determine whether the witness committed an act of dishonesty or false
statement" in conjunction with the criminal conviction).
246 Id. at 8 (acknowledging that public commentators "generally favored a strict
'elements' test" for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement, but describing the
Committee's resolution expressly to "permit some limited inquiry behind the conviction").
247 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (emphasis
added).
248 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE, T-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997). Georgia, for
example, recently clarified that by "adopt[ing] the language of the federal rule, [and] using
'dishonesty or false statement' instead of 'moral turpitude"' the legislature showed that it
did not intend for courts to continue applying a rule so broad it permitted evidence of "theft
and shoplifting" to be used to impeach witnesses. Clements v. State, 683 S.E.2d 127, 129
(Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
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charged with theft. 24 9 Before concluding that the evidence had prejudiced
defendant, the court observed that the state's moral turpitude standard
contested and that its dictionary definition had provided no sure guidance. 2 50
court illustrated the "difficulty" judges faced in "applying a test that is vague
cannot be explicitly defined" 251' by describing several inconsistent rulings
standard had produced:

the
was
The
and
the

[I]n Davis v. Wicker [the court] held that defendant in a civil action was
properly impeached by showing a conviction for not having a proper
driver's license. In McKenzie v. State, the Court apparently found that a
conviction for inciting to riot involved moral turpitude, while a
conviction for inciting children to leave school did not. In Everhart v.
State, the Court held that a testifying defendant might be asked about
convictions for violating the liquor law. The Court in Gray v. State, held
that being a bootlegger does not involve moral turpitude.25 2
The court, therefore, readily concluded that "adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence on this question should achieve a higher degree of consistency, fairness
and justice and better serve the quest for truth." 253
Other states, such as Vermont and Maine, amended statutes to eliminate moral
turpitude from their evidence codes. In Vermont, the Reporter's Notes to the 1989
Amendment to the state's evidence code called the moral turpitude standard
"troublesome" and "vague" and announced that it would be replaced with "more
precise and relevant standards for determining the admissibility of prior
convictions for impeachment." 254 In Maine, the Advisory Committee's notes also
referred to moral turpitude as a "troublesome phrase" when the state switched to an
impeachment regime more akin to the Federal Rules.25 5
At least one state that continued to use the concept of moral turpitude in
impeachment attempted to disconnect the standard from its uses in other legal
areas where the question it addressed had nothing to do with credibility. In 1981,
the Maryland Supreme Court held that a man on trial for a sex offense should not
have been impeached with evidence that he had previously been convicted of
indecent exposure.25 6 Although a previous Maryland Supreme Court opinion had

State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. 1976).
Id. (defining moral turpitude as "[aln act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted rule or right and duty between man and man").
249

250

251

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
253 Id.
254 VT. R. EVID. 609 reporter note on 1989 amendment; see also In re
Berk, 602 A.2d
946, 952 (Vt. 1991) (Morse, J., concurring) (quoting the reporter's note).
255 MAINE R. EvID. 609 advisers'
note.
256 Ricketts v. State, 436 A.2d 906, 912-13
(Md. 1981).
252
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treated indecent exposure as a crime of moral turpitude, 2 57 the court distinguished
the case because it involved a licensing board's decision to revoke a dental license,
not the impeachment of a witness. 2 58 It was significant, the court reasoned, that in
the licensing context, the board is "apprised of the circumstances" attending the
conviction, whereas under Maryland impeachment practice, the rules did not
permit much factual background relating to a prior conviction."' Without that
information, the court concluded that it was impossible to determine whether the
crime showed "a moral depravity sufficient to impact upon his credibility." 260 Yet,
the very fact that the court had to write an opinion stating that moral turpitude in
evidence was different from moral turpitude in licensing highlights the reality that
the standard traditionally functions independently of its legal context.
Two states remain outliers and continue to use moral turpitude in witness
impeachment. Texas has never eliminated the standard from its evidence code.26 1
And, surprisingly enough, in the mid-1980s, California ratified the state's use of
moral turpitude as a standard for impeachment with prior crimes.262
The California court reasoned that "the constitutional imperative of relevance
prohibits impeachment with felonies which do not connote moral laxity of any
kind." 2 6 3 Accordingly, it held that "it will be necessary to determine with respect to
each felony conviction offered for impeachment-difficult though this may prove
to be-whether it does or does not involve moral turpitude." 264 While it
acknowledged that "[p]ermitting impeachment with crimes involving moral

257 Id. at 912 (citing Dental Examiners v. Lazzell, 191 A. 240 (Md. 1937)).
258

Id.
Id. Not all states follow the rule, and the Federal Rules currently permit some
inquiry into the elements of a crime in order to determine whether it involved dishonesty or
false statement. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (permitting impeachment of a witness
with evidence of a criminal conviction "if the court can readily determine that establishing
the elements of the crime required proving-or the witness's admitting-a dishonest act or
false statement"); State v. Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d 425, 436 (Minn. 2006) (noting that for
impeachment purposes "district courts may permit inquiring into underlying facts [of a
prior conviction] when the defendant opens the door") (internal quotation marks omitted).
260 Ricketts, 436 A.2d at 911. Similarly, in Virginia, although the courts continued to
parrot the state's rule that a witness could be impeached with evidence of a misdemeanor
conviction involving moral turpitude, they seemed to equate the standard with a focus on
crimes involving deception. See, e.g., Chrisman v. Virginia, 348 S.E.2d 399, 401-03 (Va.
Ct. App. 1986) (invoking the moral turpitude standard before describing as "well settled"
the rule that a witness's credibility "cannot be impeached by proof of a prior conviction . . .
unless the crime be one which involved the character of the witness for veracity").
261 TEX. R. EVID. 609(a) ("For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from
the witness or established by public record but only if the crime was a felony or involved
moral turpitude.").
262 People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 120 (Cal. 1985).
263 id.
259

264

id
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turpitude" from an administrative perspective "has proved awkward," 26 5 the
majority justified its decision to adopt the standard by stating that "considerable
bodies of law" exist "in connection with other statutes" that characterize "felonies
as involving or not involving moral turpitude." 266
Chief Justice Bird vigorously disputed the majority's optimistic view that
moral turpitude would be an administrable standard. 2 67 "In adopting moral
turpitude as the standard for determining which felonies are admissible to impeach
the credibility of a witness," she wrote, "the majority create enormous problems
for our trial courts. Rather than providing clear guidance, the majority promulgate
a rule which is guaranteed to have no certainty of application." 26 8 The chief justice
went on to accuse her colleagues of "incorporating into the criminal law, vast
bodies of noncriminal law where different applications of the term have been
made."269
True to Chief Justice Bird's prediction, chief among the bodies of law
California courts have looked to in making impeachment decisions has been
federal immigration law, whose difficulties are discussed in the next Part of this
Article. California courts have imported the two major idiosyncrasies of this area
of federal moral turpitude jurisprudence into their own evidence law. Notably, in
contrast to Rule 609, they refuse to look at anything beyond the elements of a
270
In
witness's prior conviction when making moral turpitude determinations.
addition, they have agreed with the federal courts that the way to make moral
turpitude decisions in borderline cases is by looking for an element of evil
intent.2 7 1 As these decisions demonstrate, the moral turpitude standard has steered
California courts away from the question of credibility. Instead, California remains
in a form of stasis in which certain crimes that historically involved moral
turpitude still fall within the standard and are therefore viewed as relevant to
credibility. For example, although almost a century ago most courts in the country
reached a consensus that evidence of a woman's lack of chastity was not relevant
to her credibility, California courts continue to insist that evidence of prostitution
is admissible on the issue of credibility because prostitution is a crime involving
265
26 6

Id. at 120 n.11.
Id.

Id. at 125 (Bird, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
at 132.
at 133.
270 See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 718 (Ct. App. 1994)
(describing California's rule that the court must consider the "least adjudicated elements"
test, which requires that from "the elements of the offense alone-without regard to the
facts of the particular violation-one can reasonably infer the presence of moral
turpitude"); People v. Garrett, 241 Cal. Rptr. 10, 11 (Ct. App. 1987) ("A witness in a
criminal trial may be impeached with a prior felony conviction if the least adjudicated
267

26 8

1 d.
26 9
1 d.

elements of that felony necessarily involve moral turpitude.").
271 See, e.g., Campbell, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718-19 (finding the malicious intent
required for a conviction of felony vandalism betokens that "'general readiness to do evil'
which constitutes moral turpitude").
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moral turpitude. 27 2 Other crimes at the margins of the standard's historical
boundaries are deemed only relevant to credibility if they involve some degree of
scienter, a line that in our current legal system, with its burgeoning criminal codes,
often has little to do with truthfulness.
III. MORAL TURPITUDE AND LAWS OF EXCLUSION
In 1891, as its use in evidence and slander cases was at its height, Congress
adapted the moral turpitude standard to yet another purpose: to police the shape of
the polity. The Immigration Act of 1891 (Immigration Act) required the exclusion
of "persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. ... 273 In 1917, Congress expanded that
provision to permit the deportation of immigrants convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude.274 Although it was an outgrowth of the common law, the federal
standard did not signify reputational harm or link a bad reputation to dubious
credibility. 2 75 Instead, the standard was part of a character metric used to gauge the
fitness of individuals to enter or remain in the country. As the latter section of this
Part shows, despite that very different objective, courts maintained an approach to
moral turpitude that privileged the original core honor norms that had shaped the
standard's early bounds. In marginal cases, courts continued to use proxies for
moral turpitude that had little to do with underlying immigration policy goals.
The first section of this Part traces moral turpitude's path into immigration
law. That path highlights the character-policing function the standard acquired as it
was appropriated by legislatures in search of rules for controlling access to the
ballot and by professional groups seeking to establish norms of rectitude for
members. It is in that capacity, as a delimiter of acceptable character, that moral
turpitude plays its most prominent role today. Several professions use the standard
as a membership criterion,276 states use it to screen jury pools and voting rolls,2 7 7
See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, No. C052744, 2011 WL 1671560, at *24 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 4, 2011) ("Misdemeanor conduct of prostitution represents a crime of moral
turpitude.").
273 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084.
274 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952).
275 Moral turpitude had another role in federal law in the period between Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The
standard had a function in due process cases analogous to its role in slander: it signaled
accusations that implicate a liberty interest because they inflict severe reputational harm.
See, e.g., Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 365-66 (9th Cir. 1976)
(observing that Roth's "notion of liberty, while imprecise, distinguishes between a stigma
of moral turpitude, which infringes the liberty interest, and a charge of incompetence or
inability to get along with coworkers which does not").
For an account of moral requirements in the context of professional licensing,
including a brief discussion of moral turpitude, see Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras
272

a ProfessionalCredential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985).
277 See infra Part III.A.
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and it remains a significant element of federal immigration law.2 78 In these areas,
moral turpitude functions both as an entry test and a collateral sanctioning
mechanism-thereby depriving people of a right of residence, 2 7 9 the privilege of
voting,280 or a professional license after an initial adjudication of guilt and the
imposition of a first-order punishment. 2 8 1 The standard has presented legislatures
with a seemingly flexible, socially and temporally adaptive method for imposing
those sanctions in a way that purports to correlate to moral beliefs. Yet, as this
section shows, the standard primarily serves to reinforce an ossified vision of core
nineteenth-century honor norms or, in marginal cases, to track a formal legal
conception of mens rea that leaves no space for moral reasoning.
A. Voter Disenfranchisement

When Congress broadened the immigration statute in 1891 to add crimes
involving moral turpitude as an exclusion category, the nearest precedents for its
use as a collateral sanction were post-Reconstruction laws aimed at
disenfranchising black men.2 82 These disenfranchisement laws were specifically
aimed at maintaining white supremacy in the post-Reconstruction South. Yet, like
the federal immigration law, disenfranchisement statutes used moral turpitude to
sort acceptable character traits from those that were disqualifying in order to
maintain a particular social order. Moral turpitude functioned to mark a set of norm
violations that had been singled out for opprobrium since the early days of the
Republic. This function, combined with its fuzziness when applied to crimes at the
margins, made it well suited to the purpose of selective disenfranchisement.2 83
Unlike the sparse congressional record on the scope of the standard in the 1891
immigration bill, the background of state disenfranchisement provisions indicates
that the standard was meant to track the traditional honor code, identifying crimes
of deception, theft, and perceived sexual perversion, while focusing less on crimes
of violence or statutory violations. Not surprisingly, the former crimes were
viewed as crimes committed more frequently by the poor and disadvantaged.
Political scientist Alec Ewald .has argued, persuasively, that criminal
disenfranchisement laws were enabled, in part, by a republican ideology that held
that the "health of the polity depends on the character of those who comprise it." 2 84
As described in Part I, the same interest in creating a union of responsible citizens
278 See infra Part III.B.

See infra notes 282-284 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 284-310 and accompanying text.
281 See Rhode, supra note
276.
282 See GA. CONST. OF 1877, art. II, § 2, para. I (repealed 1983) (disenfranchising
"[tihose who shall have been convicted ... of any crime involving moral turpitude"); see
also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226 (1985) (striking down ALA. CONST. of 1901
279

280

art. VIII, § 182 for impermissible discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment).
283 See, e.g., Hunter, 471 U.S.
at 226.
Alec C. Ewald,

"Civil Death ": The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
DisenfranchisementLaw in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1045, 1083 (2002).
284
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informed the cultural content of moral turpitude. Ewald shows how the project of
creating a virtuous republic can all too easily merge with the goal of preserving
racial hierarchies. 2 85 Voting restrictions were a central tool used to this end in the
post-Reconstruction South, setting a precedent for disenfranchisement regimes that
are still active today.2 86 After the Civil War, moral turpitude and its honor code, by
then well embedded in the common law, became part of the disenfranchisement
toolkit.
In 1890, as Congress debated its new immigration legislation, Mississippi
held a constitutional convention at which it framed its racially motivated
disenfranchisement laws. Mindful of the Fifteenth Amendment, 28 7 the Mississippi
delegates modified a previous statute disenfranchising those guilty of "any crime"
to exclude only those convicted of certain offenses. 288 The drafters did not use the
phrase moral turpitude, but the crimes they enumerated had striking parallels with
moral turpitude as it had been applied in common law slander and impeachment
cases. Those crimes included "bribery, burglary, theft, arson, obtaining money or
goods under false pretenses, perjury, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy." 289
In the first case to discuss the new statute, the Mississippi Supreme Court
explained that the provision was intended within the "limitations imposed by the
federal constitution" to "obstruct the exercise of the franchise by the negro
race."290 According to the court, the statute accomplished its aims because blacks
had "certain peculiarities of habit, of temperament, and of character" that led them
to commit "furtive offenses" rather than "the robust crimes of whites." 291 It went
on to note that the drafters of the Mississippi Constitution had thus been able to
avoid overt discrimination against black people by "discriminat[ing] against ...
the offenses to which [they] were prone." 292 Those convicted of violent crimes,
such as "robbery and murder," 293 did not suffer the same loss of voting rights.
Georgia, South Carolina, and Alabama also passed laws aimed at
disenfranchising black men by discriminating against certain offenses. In 1877,
Georgia passed the first constitutional amendment to overtly use the moral
285See id. at 1048.
286 Id. at 1091 ("[LI aws

disenfranchising criminals were among the first tools
blacks
from politics after Reconstruction."). Current felony
employed by whites to remove
disenfranchisement statutes continue to disadvantage African-American men primarily as a
result of twentieth-century drug laws and enforcement patterns that lead to racially skewed
conviction rates. See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 107 (2006).
287 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.").
288 Ewald, supra note 284, at
1091.
289 Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 867 (Miss.
1896).
290 Id. at 868.
291

Id
id.
293 id.
292
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turpitude standard as a disenfranchisement tool. The amendment disqualified
"[t]hose who shall have been convicted ... of any crime involving moral turpitude,
punishable by the laws of this State with imprisonment in the penitentiary." 29 4 In
1901, Alabama also included the moral turpitude standard in a constitutional
amendment governing the franchise.295 The Alabama provision, after enumerating
a long list of offenses such as treason, murder, receiving stolen property, perjury
offenses, robbery, forgery, bribery, assault and battery on the wife, certain sex
crimes, and miscegenation, added what the United States Supreme Court later
provision "covering 'any
termed a 2"catchall"
96

.

.

.

crime involving moral

turpitude."'
Moral turpitude as a catchall could encompass the pettiest of misdemeanors,
but it worked along lines similar to the enumerated offenses in the Alabama
provision. As it had been applied, it would not cover assault and battery or, most
likely, other violent crimes short of murder, but it would apply to even the most
minor of thefts. 2 97 Further, because of its lack of clarity at the margins, the standard
would give voting officials the discretion to read "between the lines" for "the
intent and expectation [was] that the phrase would be used in a discriminatory
manner." 298 It was a discretion that officials used effectively, albeit opaquely, since
they were not required to provide written justifications for their decisions. 299
The one Alabama case to discuss moral turpitude as a voter qualification
preceded the 1901 constitutional amendment that made moral turpitude a
constitutional ground for disenfranchisement. In a case applying an earlier
provision that specified larceny as an offense that would warrant
disenfranchisement, the Alabama Supreme Court invoked a connection between
moral turpitude and overall character. It wrote:
The manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is
the only sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs
protection against the invasion of corruption, just as much as against that
1877, art. II, § 2, para. 1. The debate over the moral turpitude
provision made no reference to disenfranchising black voters. Historians have found,
however, that other disenfranchisement measures adopted at the convention, including poll
taxes, were intended to disenfranchise blacks and poor whites. ARNOLD FLEISCHMANN &
CAROL PIERANNUNZI, GEORGIA'S CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT 15,40 (6th ed. 2006).
295 ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, §
182.
296 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226 (1985) (citing ALA. CONST. of 1901, art.
VIII, § 182).
297 See supra Parts
I-II.
298 Ewald, supra note 284, at
1094.
299 See id. ("[A] historian hired by the Alabama state registrars found that by January
1903, the revised constitution 'had disenfranchised approximately ten times as many blacks
294

GA. CONST. of

as whites."' (quoting Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227)); see also Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d

614, 616 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[The Alabama Attorney General] has acknowledged that
the classification of presently unaddressed offenses will turn upon the moral standards of
the judges who decide the question." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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of ignorance, incapacity, or tyranny. . . . The presumption is, that one

rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense
indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of

suffrage, or to hold office, upon terms of equality with freemen who are
clothed by the State with the toga of political citizenship. It is proper,
therefore, that this class should be denied a right, the exercise of which
might sometimes hazard the welfare of communities, if not that of the
State itself, at least in close political contests.3 00
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court, faced with plain evidence of
animus, held that Alabama's constitutional provision disenfranchising anyone
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 30 ' The case had been brought by two residents of the state
who "were disfranchised for presenting worthless checks, a misdemeanor which
the [state] registrars classiff ied] as a crime of moral turpitude." 302 The Court's
opinion reveals that the Alabama disenfranchisement regime mirrored the
traditional bounds of the standard. Various minor nonfelony offenses such as
"presenting a worthless check and petty larceny" fell within its sweep.3 03 Yet, the
"more serious nonfelony offenses such as second-degree manslaughter [and]
assault on a police officer" did not invoke the collateral sanction.304 Those crimes
were "neither enumerated . . . nor considered crimes involving moral turpitude." 305
The historical evidence made clear that "the crimes selected for inclusion . . . were
believed by the [Alabama] delegates to be more frequently committed by
blacks."30s
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the 1901
amendment had a disparate impact on blacks and had been enacted out of racial
animus for exactly that purpose. 30 7 He noted that by as early as January 1903, the
1901 amendment "had disfranchised approximately ten times as many blacks as
whites." 308 The disparate impact persisted through the 1980s, and the Court noted
Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884) (emphasis added).
Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233. The Court had previously found that the moral turpitude
standard had been used impermissibly as a policing mechanism in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1942). In that case, an Oklahoma law provided that the state could
sterilize persons who were convicted three or more times of crimes "amounting to felonies
involving moral turpitude." Id. at 536, 539 (citations omitted).
300

301

302 Underwood, 730 F.2d at 615-16.
303 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 226.
304 Id. at 227.
305
306

Id.
Id.

307 Id. at 229-30.

Id. at 227 (quoting Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 620 (11th Cir. 1984)).
Recent studies have shown that felony disenfranchisement laws prevent approximately 5.3
million Americans from voting; disproportionate racial effects disqualify as many as one in
308

four black men from voting in some states. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 286, at 77,
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that "[i]n Jefferson and Montgomery Counties blacks are-by even the most
modest estimates-at least 1.7 times as likely as whites to suffer disfranchisement
under section 182 for the commission of nonprison offenses." 309 These nonprison
offenses generally qualified under the disenfranchisement law because they were
deemed crimes of moral turpitude. 3 10
Moral turpitude's history as a disenfranchisement. standard shows how readily
the standard functioned to maintain social hierarchies. Not only was the standard
opaque, particularly when applied by election officials, but also the very core
honor norms of the early nineteenth century that inhered in the concept of moral
turpitude made it an effective conduit for racial animus. The set of conduct
standards that moral turpitude embodied were a product of a historical moment and
the needs of a political class. As such, these standards tended to disfavor those who
were less financially fortunate or who lived in ways that ran afoul of morals
regulations. From moral turpitude's earliest use in the law of slander, courts had
distinguished between certain crimes of violence, which were viewed forgivingly,
and crimes of deception, theft, and unchastity, which were viewed as debasing. As
Hunter v. Underwood demonstrates, in the post-Reconstruction South, these
factors made the standard ripe for appropriation as a tool for discrimination.
B. Immigration

The idea in the disenfranchisement statutes that the welfare of the state itself
is threatened when persons "of great moral turpitude" are given political agency
provides a key to understanding the standard's current place in American
immigration law. That immigration law has been described as "a 100-plus years
social experiment." 3 1 1 Beginning in the late 1700s, when Congress limited

80. See generally JAMIE

FELLNER & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING
THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES

(Oct.
1998),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/FVR/fd
losingthevote.pdf (A "fifty-state survey of the impact of criminal disenfranchisement
laws."); RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE VANISHING
BLACK ELECTORATE: FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA (Sept. 2004),
available
at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd-vanishingblack
electorate.pdf (discussing the disenfranchisement of individuals with felony convictions in
light of the historic disenfranchisement of African Americans); Juan Cartagena, Lost Votes,
Body Counts and Joblessness: The Effects of Felon Disenfranchisementon Latino Civic
Engagement, 6 LATINO STUD. 192 (2008) (discussing the loss of Latino votes and lack of

civic engagement in the New York City area due to incarceration).
309 Hunter,471 U.S. at 227 (quoting Underwood, 730 F.2d at 620).
310 Id. at 226-27. In the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, on which the Supreme Court
relied heavily in striking down the provision, the court noted that the selection of which
nonprison offenses would qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude was suspicious for
its arbitrariness. Underwood, 730 F.2d at 620.
311 DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

243 (2007).

2012]

MORAL TURPITUDE

1045

citizenship to "free white persons," 3 12 laws governing immigration and citizenship
aided the project of protecting the polity from those deemed dangerous to the
national character or unlikely to be good citizens.3 13 Morals legislation was
prevalent in nineteenth-century criminal law, much of which reflected "a more
general concern for order, ethics, good manners, respectable habits, and standards
of decency."3 14 That concern only increased as the century progressed-the
product of a self-conscious quest to produce citizens who were disciplined to work,
committed to frugality, and amenable to well-ordered governance.3 1 Scholars have
identified laws as diverse as antiliquor legislation and quarantine regulations as an
outgrowth of the larger project of the "policing of dangerous classes."3 16 All such
laws, to an extent, "established hierarchies of social difference" by distinguishing
between "the orderly and the disorderly" or between wellness and sickness.317 At
the same time, generalized concern for moral rectitude could easily mask animus
towards particular groups. As is familiar history, our first immigration laws aimed
at "undesirables" were impelled by hostility towards Chinese immigrants.3 18
A vision of social rectitude drove the adoption of the moral turpitude standard
in the 1891 Immigration Act, just as it had eighty years earlier when politicians
used the phrase as an insult and courts turned it into a legal standard. In the same
way that contemporaneous criminal-disenfranchisement statutes aimed at "[tihe
perceived need to protect society against moral infection," 3 19 moral turpitude as an
immigration standard functioned to protect the polity from persons identified as
not belonging. 32 0 As in criminal disenfranchisement, the Immigration Act gave
James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution
of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REv. 359,
368 (2010) (arguing that Congress began controlling citizenship well before the 1875 Act
through its "broad power to define which classes of persons were entitled to citizenship").
312

313 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of
Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 643 (2005) (arguing with reference to the

Immigration Act of 1875 that "concern about preserving traditional American conceptions
of marriage and family lies at the root of our federal immigration system").
314 See NOVAK, supra note 68, at 149.
3
Id. at 150, 154.
3
Id. at 178-86, 216.
317
Id. at 216.
318 The first federal immigration law, the Page Law of 1875, targeted contract laborers
from China and Chinese women engaged in prostitution for exclusion. Page Act of 1875,
ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974); see also, Abrams, supra note 313, at 694 (noting that
in support of the passage of the Page Law, Senator Page expressed "a fear that China was
sending its most debased citizens to the United States--coolie laborers and prostitutes, not
respectable merchants-and that America would be weakened as a result").
319 Ewald, supra note 284, at 1084 n.166.
320 The xenophobia that provoked the first immigration statutes has been well
documented. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 313, at 643 (documenting animus against

Chinese that led to passage of the Page Law); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United
States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV.

853, 855-56, 856 n.11 (1987) (identifying among reasons for the Page Law, "growing
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legal force to Congress's concern with "character, and with particular forms of
sickness which are held to be more dangerous than others to the body politic."32'
The 1891 immigration amendments were explicitly intended to respond to a
"universal and emphatic" demand for stricter immigration requirements and
enforcement.322 To that end, Congress replaced exclusion rules that had previously
barred "all foreign convicts except those convicted of political offenses," 323 with a
stricter provision that specifically excluded "persons who have been convicted of a
felony or other infamous crimes or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude."324
As had the Brooker court, Congress evidently assumed that the meaning of moral
turpitude would be well understood. It did not debate the precise wording of the
new bill and provided no definition for the term. Nevertheless, the historical
context -suggests that the goal was to filter out those immigrants who were
perceived to pose the greatest threat to American values. Those who had
committed mere political crimes in other countries were still exempted. 32 5 As
Congress continued to reenact the moral turpitude bar in immigration statutes over
the course of the twentieth century, it continued to leave the term undefined,
delegating the responsibility for fathoming moral turpitude's meaning to
immigration officials and the federal courts.
Like the state courts, the federal courts continued to adhere to the core
valence of moral turpitude when they applied the standard. At the margins as well,
a now-familiar pattern repeated itself. Like their state counterparts, federal judges
sought ways to make moral turpitude operational by couching the question in the
terms of clearer common law concepts. The courts' desire to avoid moral
pronouncements in unclear cases pushed them away from determinations about
community moral beliefs. Instead, they hewed to per se categories of crimes
involving moral turpitude that had long formed the core of the standard even as
they created a categorical approach that removed decisions at the margins from the
realm of morality. 32 6 In so doing, the courts arguably took a positive step away
'nativism,' racism, and xenophobia"). In 1875, the immigration of "Chinese prostitutes and
European criminals" had provoked such moral indignation in political leaders that they
passed the first federal regulations on immigration. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, at 66 (1981).
321 Ewald, supra note 284, at 1086. In his address to Congress before passage of the
1875 Immigration Act, President Grant stated that the exclusion of prostitutes, in particular,
was vital lest they "disgrace ... the communities" where they settled and "demoraliz[ed]
the youth of th[o]se localities." See HUTCHINSON, supra note 320, at 65 (quoting President
Grant's message to Congress of December 7, 1874). In 1903, President Theodore
Roosevelt observed that the difficulty lay in how "to devise some system by which
undesirable immigrants shall be kept out entirely." 38 CONG. REC. 3 (1903) (statement of
Mr. B. F. Bames).
322 22 CONG. REC. 3176 (1891) (statement of Rep. James Covert).
323 Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
324 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084.
325 22 CONG. REC. 3176 (1891) (statement of Rep. James Covert).
326 Moral turpitude also functions as a standard for collateral sanctions

in myriad state

professional licensing and public benefit contexts, which at present account for many of the
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from the kind of biased enforcement that occurred in states using the standard to
disenfranchise voters. At the same time, by implicitly clinging to the historic
essence of the standard while ignoring moral nuance in difficult cases, the courts
have applied a set of rules and values to the deportation of immigrants that make
its announced definition a nullity and at the very least deserve to be reevaluated.
1. Moral Turpitude and Core Honor Norms
When Congress expanded the reach of the moral turpitude standard in 1917 to
cover deportation as well as exclusion, 327 it added language that created a
two-tiered approach to moral turpitude deportation. Aliens who were sentenced to
terms of one year or more for fresh moral turpitude crimes-that is those

opinions emanating from the state courts on the standard. Even a cursory review of these
cases and the legal literature shows that in this context, despite the benefit of fully
developed records and hearings, the standard looks much the same as it does in federal
immigration law. Courts applying it rely on analogues to scienter or malum in se, and
reinforce entrenched ideas that fraud and crimes of sexual deviance are at the heart of
moral turpitude. See, e.g., In re Conduct of Chase, 702 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Or. 1985) (noting
that Oregon has decided attorney sanctioning cases "on the basis of the nature of the crime
itself, often applying the common law distinction between a crime malum in se, a crime
inherently evil and wrong in itself, and a crime malum prohibitum, a crime wrong only
because it is prohibited by legislation"); see also In re Caplan, 691 A.2d 1152, 1152 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (per curium) (disbarring attorney because "[clriminal offenses involving theft
and fraud inherently involve moral turpitude"); In re Lesansky, 17 P.3d 764, 767 (Cal.
2001) (finding that "[i]n the attorney discipline context, the term 'moral turpitude' includes
'particular crimes that are extremely repugnant to accepted moral standards such as . . .
serious sexual offenses'); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof 1 Ethics & Conduct v.
Lyzenga, 619 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 2000) (holding that attorney who accepted payment
from undercover police officers to perform acts of sexual self-gratification was guilty of
conduct involving moral turpitude because prostitution has always been a crime of moral
turpitude and "society in general still views prostitution as immoral conduct"); Oltman v.
Maryland State Bd. of Physicians, 875 A.2d 200, 212 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (finding
physician's assistant who obtained Ritalin prescriptions for his son after his son was no
longer covered by insurance should lose his license for moral turpitude because "[i]t is
settled that whatever else it may mean, [moral turpitude] includes fraud and .. . a crime in
which an intent to defraud is an essential element is a crime involving moral turpitude"); In
re Howard, 681 P.2d 775, 776 (Or. 1984) (approving attorney's admission that his
misdemeanor conviction for paying a fee to engage in sexual condiict constituted "a
conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude"); Rhode, supra note 276, at 57781 (describing interest in marital relations and sexual conduct by bar licensing bodies).
327 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874. In 1892, the Supreme Court had
held that the 1891 Act was constitutional insofar as it provided for the appointment of an
inspector of immigration who would make final exclusion determinations subject to limited
administrative review. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 664 (1892). The Act
was amended in 1903 to eliminate the reference to "infamous crimes." Act of Mar. 3, 1903,
ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903).

UTAH LAW REVIEW

1048

[No. 2

committed within five years of entry to the country-were deportable.328 In
addition, aliens would be deportable if they were "sentenced more than once to ...
a term of imprisonment [of one year or more] because of conviction in this country
of any crime involving moral turpitude" regardless of the timing of the
convictions.329 By removing any time limitation on the second moral turpitude
conviction, the revised law invested the standard with more power than most other
deportation standards. 3 30 A second conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is still one of the ways in which the government can deport a person long
after he or she has come to the country.33'
The 1917 legislative history provides little guidance on congressional
understanding of the standard. Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that
Congress anticipated a case-specific analysis that would be sensitive to an
individual's unique circumstances. There is also evidence that Congress, if forced
to articulate a theory, would have approved an analysis focusing on guilty
knowledge or mens rea. For example, Representative Sabath of Illinois, as part of a
debate on moral turpitude deportations, explained that he had "no desire to protect
the real criminal, a man who is criminal at heart, a man who is guilty of a second
offense involving moral turpitude."332 His goal, he said, was to protect the first
offender, the man who "without thinking and without really knowing it is an
offense, does something which may be designated technically as a crime involving
moral turpitude." 333 To demonstrate his concern for the first offender, he stated that
"[i]n certain sections of this country the larceny of a few pennies or of a piece of
coal or a loaf of bread is considered a crime involving moral turpitude." 334
Whether that argument was a reference to differing community mores or to
federalism and local and regional variations in criminal codes, it shows that one
representative, at least, anticipated that the standard would be used with reference
to local mores.335
Immigration Act of 1917 § 19.
Immigration Act of 1917 § 19. The Act reflected anti-German xenophobia
stemming from World War I and was passed over President Wilson's veto. DEBRA L.
DELAET, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AN AGE OF RIGHTS 31 (2000); see also
KANSTROOM, supra note 311, at 140-41 (describing anti-German rhetoric in connection
with deportation laws).
330 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Presidentand Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 515 (2009) ("Congress time-limited nearly all grounds of deportability in
the first three decades of federal immigration law.").
331 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) ("[A]ny alien who at any time after admission
is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude ... is deportable.").
332 53 CONG. REC. 5167 (1916) (statement of Rep. Adolph Sabath).
333 Id.
328
329

334 id.
335 The scant case law on moral turpitude was not a factor in the 1917 legislative

history. However, it seems unlikely that Representative Sabath would have approved of
Judge Noyes's formalistic analysis, discussed infra in Part III.B.2.(a), that focused only on
mens rea. Under that analysis, larceny of a few pennies could qualify as a crime involving
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The reality was different. As applied by the federal courts, moral turpitude
continued to track the honor norms of the previous century. In 1926, the standard
became the source of a scandal that dramatized the extent to which conventional
mores-in this case sexual double standards-were at work in administrative
decision making. That reality has since been documented more broadly by
immigration scholars,336 but the attempted deportation of a minor celebrity, Vera,
Countess of Cathcart, brought moral turpitude to the headlines.
Countess Cathcart had divorced her second husband after having an affair
with the then-married (and aptly named) Earl of Craven.3 37 The affair was long
over, and Vera was on her way to New York to sell a play she had written when
she caught the attention of immigration officials at Ellis Island.33 8 Those officials
declared that Vera's adultery, was an excludable offense because it qualified as a
crime of moral turpitude under the Immigration Statute. 3 39 Vera's youth, title, and
the fact that, despite his equally adulterous past, the Earl of Craven had recently
been admitted to the country without incident, attracted a swell of press attention to
her plight. 34 0 American feminists became involved, arguing that there should be "a
single standard of morals" for women and men. 34 1 Mayor LaGuardia wrote
publicly on behalf of the countess, also arguing against the moral double
standard.342 The New York Times reprinted an editorial from London's Evening
Standard,which pointed out, among other things, that "[i]t may provoke a smile to
compare the moral standards of Ellis Islands with those of Hollywood."3 43
American writers expressed similar sentiments. 344 One prominent Lutheran
minister preached a sermon in which he told his audience, "Our popular lack of
of us seem
reverence was never more clearly illustrated than in the fact that34many
5
actually puzzled whether adultery constitutes 'moral turpitude."'
The resulting legal proceedings involved a parade of American notables. One
year after his work on the Scopes trial, Arthur Garfield Hays agreed to represent

moral turpitude-if any jurisdiction were to punish this type of offense with a sentence of
over a year-because it was a crime that required at least a mens rea of knowledge.
336 See, e.g., CANNATO, supra note 14, at 246 ("Women of all nationalities fell victim
to the prying investigations of immigration officials [as] . . . enforcing the nation's

immigration laws often meant enforcing middle class ideas of sexual morality."); see also
CLARK, supra note 14, at 493-94 (reproducing questions asked of sixteen-year-old girl
seeking to enter the country in 1926, including whether she had "immoral relations" with
boys).
337 CANNATO, supra note 14, at 260.
338
Id.
3

at 260-61.
11 Id. at 261.
340
Id. at 262.
341 Ban on Countess Assailed by Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1926, at 3.
342

d

343 Scores Us for Bad Manners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1926, at 6.
344 Hits Exclusion Policy: Rev. Mr. Steimle Criticizes Treatment of Countess
Cathcart,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1926, at 2.
345

id.
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the countess.346 When the Secretary of Labor upheld Vera's deportation order, the
New York Times gave her story front page billing, noting that her attorneys would
appeal for a writ of habeas corpus to none other than Judge Learned Hand.3 4 7 The
case did not reach Judge Hand. After several weeks of public uproar, a judge
sitting in the Southern District of New York issued the writ, thus overturning the
exclusion order and permitting Vera entry into the country.348 The Cathcart scandal
led some in Congress to question the broad delegation of discretion to immigration
officials that moral turpitude represented, and a bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives that would have limited the grounds for exclusion of aliens to the
commission of a felony. 34 9 The bill apparently failed or was withdrawn after the
case was resolved and congressional attention waned when the issue left the
headlines. 350

In the meantime, the changes made in the 1917 Immigration Act resulted in a
dramatic increase in the number of judicial opinions reviewing exclusions or
deportations for moral turpitude. 35 1 Those opinions showed the continued pull of
the honor norms, even as cultural values were shifting and the idea of a shared
moral compass seemed increasingly discordant with reality. In 1926, for example,
a federal judge sitting in the District Court of Massachusetts found that an assault
on a police officer with a razor blade did not constitute moral turpitude. 3 52 In a rare
effort to explain a core demarcation of moral turpitude in terms of its definition,
the court explained:
If one ordinarily law-abiding, in the heat of anger, strikes another, that
act would not reveal such inherent baseness or depravity as to suggest the
idea of moral turpitude. If, on the other hand, one deliberately assaulted
an officer of the law with a dangerous weapon and with felonious intent,
or for the purpose of interfering with the officer in the performance of his
duty, the attendant circumstances showing an inclination toward
lawlessness, the act might well be considered as one involving moral
346

See CANNATO, supra note 14, at 262.

347 Countess Cathcart Is to Be Deported by Davis's Order, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,

1926, at 1.
348 Countess Cathcart Wins Right to Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1926, at 1. Countess
Cathcart's association with moral turpitude would endure. In 1942, when William Langer,
a Senator from North Dakota, was accused of "moral turpitude" as a State official and
almost impeached after some less-than-honorable business dealings, Life Magazine
described the event as "giving that charge its first national workout since the Countess of

Cathcart was barred from the U.S. in 1926." See Senate Seats Langer: Dakota Boss Wins
Over "MoralTurpitude" Charge,LIFE MAG., Apr. 6, 1942, at 28, 28.
349 Would Amend Alien Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1926, at 6.
350

There appears to be no report of the bill other than the one New York Times

article.
351 A Westlaw search reveals a total of forty-nine opinions containing the word
"alien" and the phrase "moral turpitude" prior to 1917. In the twenty years following the
passage of the Immigration Act of 1917, the same search terms produce 162 cases.
352 Ciambelli ex rel. Maranci v. Johnson, 12 F.2d 465, 466 (D. Mass.
1926).
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turpitude. Between the two lies the line of demarcation which I do not
undertake to define accurately. 35 3
Faced with such a line-drawing problem, the court chose the less controversial
avenue, finding that the assault was not a crime involving moral turpitude.354
Other courts followed. The Second Circuit, for example, found that a man
convicted of assault in the second degree should not be deported. 3 55 The court
noted the general principle that "a mere assault does not involve moral
turpitude." 3 56 Almost a century later, it is still the rule that assaults that do not
involve deadly weapons do not involve moral turpitude even when a police officer
is injured. For example, the Eastern District of New York held in 2005 that "a
second degree assault, in which a police officer is injured when the assaulting party
intentionally interferes with the officer's lawful duty, is not a crime involving
moral turpitude." 357 The court explained that it was merely following wellestablished precedent: "According to the [Board of Immigration Appeals]," it
wrote, "simple assault is not a crime of moral turpitude, but assault with a deadly
weapon is; a conviction for misconduct that caused bodily injury is not a crime of
moral turpitude, but where the conduct caused serious bodily injury, it is."358
Just as the moral turpitude honor code has always been forgiving of crimes
involving violence, crimes involving deception have always been treated as core
violations.3 5 9 The federal courts, for example, have consistently adhered to the idea
that fraud is the essence of moral turpitude. The United States Supreme Court in

353 Id.
354 id.
355
356

3

United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1933).
id.
Zaranska v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 400 F. Supp. 2d 500, 511 (E.D.N.Y.

2005).
358 Id. at 514 (citing Toutounjian v. INS, 959 F. Supp. 598, 603-04 (S.D.N.Y.1997)).
Courts did include the most egregious crimes of violence within the standard, but in doing
so, they often bolstered their opinions by reasoning about the mens rea of the crime, rather
than its inherent wrongfulness. For example, in 1925, the Western District of New York
denied a habeas petition from a man who was being deported for "assault with a dangerous
weapon." United States v. Smith, 8 F.2d 663, 664 (W.D.N.Y. 1925). The petitioner argued
that assault had not typically been considered a crime involving moral turpitude. Id. The
court acknowledged that fact. Id. It wrote, however, that while "mere assault and battery
concededly does not involve such a degree of depravity ... shooting [a] person is simply
an act which includes something done by the assailant contrary to good morals and proper
conduct." Id. at 664. To augment this invocation of right moral conduct, the court also
turned to the idea of "willful[ness]" to further justify its ruling. Id. "[S]ociety is entitled to
protection from willful acts of that description which frequently result in more serious
injury and consequences than that following the commission of the offense in question." Id
359 See, e.g., Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook,
J.) ("Crimes entailing deceit or false statement are within the core of the common-law
understanding of 'moral turpitude."').
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Jordan v. De George,360 its landmark case on moral turpitude in the deportation
context, reasoned that the standard was not vague precisely because courts had
consistently found that fraud involved moral turpitude. 3 6 ' At issue in Jordan was
"whether conspiracy to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits is a
'crime involving moral turpitude' within the meaning of . .. the Immigration Act
of 1917."362 Showing, once again, that the standard's core meaning traveled
irrespective of the legal question it was intended to address, the Supreme Court
ignored the fraught questions surrounding the immorality of liquor law violations
and relied instead on the long history of state court treatment of fraud as a moral
turpitude offense.363 The Court went on to list myriad fraud offenses that federal
courts had found to involve moral turpitude. 3 64 The list included the deportation of
Charles Ponzi, who was ultimately sent out of the country for mail fraud.365 It also
included obtaining goods under fraudulent. pretenses, 366 conspiracy to defraud by
deceit and falsehood, 367 forgery with intent to defraud,36 8 execution of chattel
mortgage with intent to defraud, 36 9 concealing assets in bankruptcy, 370 and issuing
checks with intent to defraud.
Jordan v. De George has cast a long shadow, both in ratifying a bright-line
rule for fraud cases and, as discussed in the next section, in shaping how the
federal courts approach borderline cases.3 7 2 For example, in a recent en banc
opinion involving an accessory-after-the-fact conviction, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that "'[a] crime having as an element the intent to defraud is clearly a crime
involving moral turpitude."' 3 7 3 In a concurrence that was the controlling opinion
on the fraud issue, Judge Reinhardt insisted that fraud is a per se category of moral
turpitude.374 He reasoned that this per se approach was necessary to prevent the
341 U.S. 223 (1951).
Id. at 227 ("Without exception, federal and state courts have held that a crime in
which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude.").
362
Id. at 223-24.
363 Id. at 227-28 (noting that in the state courts, "crimes involving fraud have
universally been held to involve moral turpitude").
3
Id. at 228.
360
311

Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F. Supp. 736, 737-38 (D. Mass. 1934).
Bermann v. Reimer, 123 F.2d 331, 332 (2d Cir. 1941).
367 Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122, 124 (10th
Cir. 1938).
368 United States ex rel. Popoff v. Reimer, 79 F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1935).
369 United States ex rel. Millard v. Tuttle,. 46 F.2d 342, 345 (E.D. La. 1930).
370 United States ex rel. Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F.2d 57, 57-58 (8th Cir.
1928).
371 United States ex rel. Portada v. Day, 16 F.2d 328, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
372 See, e.g., Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook,
J.) (upholding deportation order for man convicted of buying food stamps from welfare
recipients because, after Jordan, "crimes of deceit are the classic exemplars of moral
turpitude" (citing Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951)).
33 Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) (quoting Winestock v. INS, 576 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1978)), overruled by
United States v. Aguila-Montes De Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011).
374 Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1074.
36s

366
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fraud rule from diluting what he viewed as the proper analysis for other crimes.37
Because even the pettiest crimes involving fraud had been labeled moral turpitude,
Judge Reinhardt sought to put those crimes into a separate box from other crimes,
such as assault, which were not always found to involve moral turpitude. While
nonfraud offenses would only fall within the standard if they were particularly
base, vile or depraved, Judge Reinhardt argued that fraud offenses were always
crimes involving moral turpitude, regardless of their inherent depravity. 3 76 By
Judge Reinhardt's account, the per se fraud rule saved the courts from the
uncomfortable position of being "compelled to label all crimes involving fraud as
base, vile and depraved, and thus to deem all instances of fraud more offensive to
society than the numerous serious and even violent felonies that are punishable by
lengthy sentences but that we deem not turpitudinous." 3n
Judge Reinhardt's opinion illustrates three key points about moral turpitude
doctrine. First, courts still suggest that the standard will typically require an
analysis of the relative baseness of crimes. Judge Reinhardt's discussion of the
relative depravity of violent felonies as compared with petty thefts would not be
needed if the standard were not meant to reflect society's moral beliefs. Yet, as this
Article has shown, most courts, state and federal, in fact eschew any inquiry into
the relative moral wrongfulness of crimes when writing moral turpitude opinions.
Second, Judge Reinhardt's desire to distinguish fraud from other crimes shows,
albeit implicitly, that the rule treating fraud crimes as invariably involving moral
turpitude is flawed. It is, for example, difficult to justify treating shoplifting as
more depraved than slashing a police officer with a razor. Although Judge
Reinhardt attempts to solve this problem by placing shoplifting in a separate "fraud
crime" category in order to avoid labeling it as base, the attempt is incoherent. All
moral turpitude crimes are still defined as inherently base, vile and depraved and
contrary to community morality, whether they are so because of a per se rule or
because a court has made a thoughtful analysis of their relative vileness. Third, any
effort to rationalize moral turpitude jurisprudence will founder unless the evolution
of that jurisprudence is taken into account. Current cases that single out fraud for
special disapprobation simply continue to embody values that derive from the
honor code that the standard once defended. Fraud and deceptive dealings have
always been at the heart of moral turpitude, while crimes of violence have always
been on its margins.
With a similar lack of coherent explanation, courts applying the federal
standard have consistently found that sexual crimes involve moral turpitude.
Prostitution was listed as its own ground for exclusion under the immigration law
and thus did not need to be classified as involving moral turpitude in order to
justify exclusion or deportation. 7 8 However, as the Countess of Cathcart's case
shows, the moral turpitude standard was used to single out women for exclusion
17 1 Id.
376

3 Id.
378

at 1075.

d
Imimigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3 39 Stat. 874, 876.
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based on offenses against chastity that were regarded differently when committed
by men. In the last century, the idea that moral turpitude is linked to sexual
misconduct has lost much of its gendered dynamic as it has spread to encompass
sex crimes most often committed by men, such as statutory rape and, until recently,

sodomy. 3 79
Nevertheless, federal courts continue to treat most sexual offenses in the same
categorical way as fraud. Indecent assault,380 lewd and lascivious conduct, 38 1
incest,3 82 and contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor383 have all been
regularly found to be within the standard. Although courts have drawn the line at
certain indecent exposure convictions and declined to treat them as covered by the
standard, most sex offenses, "[u]nlike other types of crimes falling into the
category of grave and base acts, . . . have generally been classified as crimes

involving moral turpitude irrespective of any injury to the victim, physical or
otherwise." 3 84 Statutory rape is the most obvious example of the per se
classification of sex crimes as crimes involving moral turpitude. It has consistently
been treated as a crime involving moral turpitude, even when it is fully consensual
and there is only a small age difference between participants. 38 5 The explanation
n7 The moral turpitude provision for many years resulted in the systematic exclusion
of gay men from the country. See Margot Canaday, "Who is a Homosexual? ": The
Consolidation of Sexual Identities in Mid-Twentieth-Century American Immigration Law,
28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 351, 353, 359-61 (2003). In 1982, for example, the Northern
District of Texas held that a gay man from England was excludable because he had been
convicted of sodomy, a crime recognized as involving moral turpitude. In re Longstaff, 538
F. Supp. 589, 591 (N.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983); see also VelezLozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding that a man who had been
convicted of consensual sodomy under a Virginia statute was deportable because sodomy
was a crime involving moral turpitude). Only recently has a court pointed out that this per
se rule is no longer applicable after Lawrence v. Texas. Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124,
1132 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that after Lawrence, "consensual sexual conduct among adults
may not be deemed 'base, vile, and depraved' as a matter of law simply because a majority
of people happen to disapprove of a particular practice").
380 See Maghsoudi v. INS, 181 F.3d 8, 10-11 (1st Cir.
1999).
381 Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391, 394 (9th Cir.
1949).
382 Gonzalez-Alvarado v. INS, 39 F.3d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1994). Moral turpitude
as a
ground for exclusion, and in particular exclusion for incest, figures briefly in Jeffrey
Eugenides's best-selling 2002 novel, Middlesex. JEFFREY EUGENIDES, MIDDLESEX 134
(2002).
383 Sheikh v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1077, 1082 (8th
Cir. 2005).
384 Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J., dissenting)
(holding that indecent exposure conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude).
385 See, e.g., Dingena, 11 1. & N. Dec. 723 (B.I.A. 1966) (finding that statutory
rape
conviction of nineteen-year-old for sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old qualified as a
crime involving moral turpitude despite the lack of a mens rea element for the offense
under Wisconsin law). But see Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir.
2007) (reversing BIA decision that conviction of a twenty-one-year-old for sexual
intercourse with a fifteen-year-old constituted a crime involving moral turpitude); see also
id. at 695 (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting) (citing cases to show that "precedent[] leave[s] no room

MORAL TURPITUDE

2012]

1055

for the per se approach to sex crimes lies, as with fraud, in the history of the
standard. Crimes involving sexual deviance have always been part of the core
valence of moral turpitude.38 6
2. Moral Turpitude at the Margins
(a) The Genesis of the CategoricalApproach

In cases at the margins, moral turpitude in immigration jurisprudence
produced a more organized version of the avoidance techniques practiced by state
courts in slander and evidence cases. Although the standard had no doubt been
discussed in immigration proceedings, the first federal judicial opinion on the
standard's meaning in immigration law came in 1913 in a case involving, fittingly
enough, a defamation conviction. In that opinion, Judge Noyes of the Southern
District of New York set forth two principles that still form the core of today's
federal doctrine on the standard as it operates in borderline cases: (1) that the
inquiry should be confined to the record of conviction; and (2) that the term would
be equated with the element of scienter. 3 8 7
The case that reached Judge Noyes was a habeas action involving a journalist,
Edward F. Mylius, who had been convicted in England of defaming King George
V by accusing him of bigamy.388 United States immigration officials examined a
report of the English trial proceedings and decided that Mylius should be excluded
because his acts involved moral turpitude. 38 9 Judge Noyes reversed on the ground
that this analysis was improper. Instead, he held that officials should have focused
on only two questions: "(1) Is the conviction of crime established? (2) Is the crime
one which involves moral turpitude?" 390 Describing moral turpitude as a "vague
term" whose "meaning depends to some extent upon the state of public morals,"39 1
Judge Noyes, paraphrasing a law dictionary, wrote, "A crime involves moral
turpitude when its nature is such that it manifests upon the part of its perpetrator
personal depravity or baseness." 392
... for us to conclude that the crime is not one of moral turpitude").
386 This is not to say that sex crimes do not, or should not, provoke moral outrage. The
point is, rather, that the moral turpitude standard does not track that outrage, but is instead
better explained by its historical trajectory.
387 United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) aff'd, 210 F.
860 (2d Cir. 1914).
388 Mylius is Shut Out; Courts to Get Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 17, 1913, at 3.
389

United States ex rel. Mylius, 203 F. at 153 The opinion does not include the

substance of Mylius's defamatory statement.
390 Id.

3 Id. at 154.
392 Id. The dictionary

he turned to defined moral turpitude as "[a]n act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man
or to society. . . ." 20 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 872 (Garland
& McGehee, eds., 1902) (defining "moral turpitude"). Judge Noyes here had an advantage
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Judge Noyes did not pause to explain how he could assess the perpetrator's
"personal depravity" without considering his background or any of the facts
underlying his conviction. 393 Instead, he ignored the definition and moved to
externalize and narrow the inquiry. The court's role, he argued, is not to consider
the actual facts of the crime, but instead to discern the fundamental nature of the
offense. 394 Under his analysis, the sole question was whether the crime itself
necessarily involves personal depravity or baseness. 395 In turn, because libel law in
England "goes far beyond this," often targeting publishers and editors who had
been without knowledge of the libel, Judge Noyes found that "the offense ... does
not in its inherent nature involve moral turpitude" and "in classifying it under the
immigration laws, it must be designated as one which does not possess that
element."39 6
In these few moves, Judge Noyes decontextualized the federal moral turpitude
standard in favor of an abstracted focus on the elements of the crime. In so doing,
he articulated the framework for the modern "categorical approach,"3 97 which is
now used by federal courts both in immigration determinations and in the federal
sentencing guidelines. 39 8 Other factors, such as the respective institutional roles of
immigration officials and federal courts, may have informed Judge Noyes's
decision that the officials should not serve as secondary fact finders by probing the
circumstances underlying a conviction. However, the holding was a natural
over his predecessors in being able to find a law dictionary definition. Perhaps instigated
by the passage of the voting restrictions and the 1891 Immigration Act, the American and
English Encyclopaedia of Law had added an entry for "moral turpitude" in between the
1891 and 1902 editions. Compare 15 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW 715-16 (John Houston Merrill, ed. 1891) (defining "moral character" and "morality"
but not "moral turpitude) with 20 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPkDIA OF LAW
872 (Garland & McGehee, eds. 1902) (defining "moral turpitude"). The editors prefaced
the entry with the observation that it was "difficult, if not impossible, to render a
satisfactory definition." 20 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 872 n.6
(Garland & McGehee, eds. 1902).
393 United States ex rel. Mylius, 203 F. at 154.
394

id.

d
Id. at 155. One can speculate that Mylius's reputation might have been enhanced,
or at least not seriously harmed, had his reputation been known in many American
jurisdictions of the day. In this sense, it is arguable that had Judge Noyes applied a
contextual community mores analysis, the result would have been the same.
395

396

397 See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the
CategoricalAnalysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REv. 979, 994 (2008)
(discussing United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl as the first iteration of the categorical

approach); see also Dadhania, supra note 14, at 324 (describing recent developments in
applying the categorical approach in immigration law).
3 See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990); see also Doug Keller,
Causing Mischieffor Taylor's Categorical Approach: Applying "Legal Imagination" to
Duenas-Alvarez, 18 GEO. MASON L. REv. 625, 631 (2011) (describing the "categorical

approach" in sentencing enhancements for prior convictions).
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extension of judicial responses to moral turpitude in slander and evidence cases.
The categorical approach facilitated courts' desire to avoid moral assessments in
favor of mechanical rules of decision by removing much of the factual material
upon which an evaluation of an individual's moral character could be made. All
that would be necessary to determine whether a criminal conviction involved
moral turpitude was to look at the elements required for the conviction and to see if
those elements necessarily involved scienter.
Although its adoption was not universal in the early part of the twentieth
century, the Noyes formulation proved a lasting decisional guide for courts. In
1926, the Southern District of New York, perhaps still scarred by the Cathcart
scandal, applied Noyes's categorical analysis, even though the court acknowledged
that ignoring the actual conduct involved led it to a result that was "harsh and
unjust." 3 99 The petitioner was an Italian fruit seller who had come to New York in
1913 .400 According to the district court, he had paid for a load of fruit in California
with a check for $100 and had then been asked to send a second check because the
vendor claimed that the first one had been lost.4 0 1 He sent the second check without
stopping payment on the first.402 The vendor cashed both checks and the second
check bounced, at which point the vendor had the fruit seller charged with
embezzlement.4 03 The fruit seller, acting on poor legal advice, pleaded guilty to the
charge and then faced deportation proceedings.404 Because he had reentered the
country after a recent trip to Italy, the conviction was viewed as meeting the time
limitation.405
The district court, albeit reluctantly, found that the fruit seller had pleaded
guilty to a provision of the California Penal Code that required intent to defraud.406
In the court's view, this was dispositive. Going back to the usual dichotomy
between fraud and crimes of violence, the district court distinguished the case of
simple possession of "narcotics or a pistol" which does not necessarily "carry with
it a vicious intent or moral depravity . .. because the intention of committing an act
of baseness or viciousness was absent or not proven."40 7 Here, by contrast, the
court found that "the relator has pleaded guilty to a willful intention to defraud," an
act that unquestionably involved moral turpitude.408 The perverse result was that
the moral turpitude determination was unaffected by the court's own conclusion
that the fruit seller did not, in fact, intend to defraud anyone. Although the court
insisted that it was assessing the "moral depravity" of the crime, the only

399 United States ex rel. Portada v. Day, 16 F.2d 328, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
400 id
401 id.
402
d
403 Id.
404
d
405
d
406 id.
407 id.
408
d
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decisional standard apparently at work was Noyes's approach that made its
underlying facts off limits. 4 09
Curiously, there is little to suggest that Congress would have approved such
an approach. The 1917 immigration bill included a provision implicitly
acknowledging that the category, "crimes involving moral turpitude," might be
difficult to apply when unmoored from any direct review of the facts of the crime
and the circumstances of the offender. 41 0 The provision allowed the sentencing
judge to make a recommendation against deportation "at the time of . .. passing
sentence" no matter what type of crime had been committed.4 1' One Congressman
argued that "the objection" that immigrants would be deported for petty crimes
was "taken care of by the provision in the bill which forbids deportation if the
judge who enters the sentence does not desire to have a man deported." 4 12 Despite
the Noyes opinion, the congressional record gives no indication that when
Congress allowed sentencing judges to make recommendations; it anticipated that
the federal courts would bar themselves entirely from reviewing the facts of the
crimes supporting deportation orders.4 13
Executive Branch officials did little to clarify the situation. In 1933, Attorney
General Homer Cummings issued an advisory opinion that appeared to approve the
idea that moral turpitude meant immorality according to the mores "prevailing in
the United States as a whole, regarding the common view of [its] people
concerning its moral character."414 Yet, the opinion simultaneously endorsed
Noyes's categorical approach. It stated that "[i]f the alien has been convicted of a
crime such as indicated and the conviction is established, it is not the duty of the
administrative officer to go behind the judgment in order to determine purpose,
motive, and knowledge, as indicative of moral character." 415 Cummings provided
no guidance to the courts on how they were to identify a "crime such as indicated."
Nevertheless, his message-thai courts should consider the crime itself stripped of
facts and context-proved far more popular with courts than the idea that they

409

d

Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 890.
411 Immigration Act of 1917 §
19.
412 53 CONG. REc. 5169 (1916) (statement of Rep.
Mann).
413 Congress eliminated the sentencing judge's role in deportation decisions
in 1990.
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (1990)
(repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1988)); see also United States v. Koziel, 954 F.2d 831,
832 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Prior to November 29, 1990, the effective date of § 505 of the 1990
Act, § 1251(b)(2) had given the district court discretion, upon a defendant's conviction of
certain offenses, to. make a binding recommendation to the Attorney General of the United
States that the defendant not be deported on account of that conviction.").
414 Immigration Laws-Offenses Involving Moral Turpitude, 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 293,
294 (1933).
41 5
Id. at 294-95.
410
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should identify the moral beliefs of the increasingly pluralistic country in making
their rulings.416
(b) The Scienter Requirement
The federal courts, predictably, responded to the mixed messages in the
Cummings directive by ignoring any requirement that they assess views of moral
character. Instead, as had Judge Noyes and his predecessors, state judges in slander
and evidence actions, the federal courts called upon familiar stand-ins for moral
turpitude in cases at the margins. While some federal courts sought to mechanize
moral turpitude by equating it with crimes malum in se,m the scienter analysis that
appeared early in the nineteenth century and later formed part of Judge Noyes's
seminal opinion eventually became the favored approach.
The focus on scienter was an outgrowth of the idea that fraud is at the heart of
moral turpitude, but courts did not limit their use of the scienter test to fraud cases.
For example, Judge Noyes's opinion in the Mylius case contained the germ of an
intent-based analysis by suggesting, with its reference to a missing "knowledge"
element in the English libel law, that only those crimes that required a mens rea of
actual knowledge or more would qualify an immigrant foe exclusion under the
standard.4 1 8 As was the case in slander and impeachment cases, proxies for moral
turpitude were employed most commonly in cases at the margins of the old system
of norms, particularly those having to do with violations of liquor laws.

The idea that courts should only look at the elements of a criminal conviction
rather than any underlying facts has found favor with courts in professional licensing cases
as well. See, e.g., In re Lock, 54 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Tex. 2001) (noting that under moral
turpitude analysis in bar fitness cases, Texas courts "look solely to the elements of [the
attomey's] crime to determine if those elements involve any of the kinds of acts or
characteristics encompassed within our definition of moral turpitude").
417 For example, in a deportation case involving a West Indian woman, Phyllis
Edmead, who had been sentenced to a one-year county jail term for petit larceny for
stealing fifteen dollars from her employer, Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81, 82 (1st Cir.
1929), the district court granted habeas on the ground that "petit larceny did not necessarily
416

[involve moral turpitude], and .

.

. the circumstances must be inquired into to determine

whether moral turpitude was shown." Id. at 82. The First Circuit, over a strenuous dissent,
reversed. The majority resorted to Blackstone's thoughts on natural law to explain the
district court's error. Id. at 83 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *54-58).
Petit larceny involves moral turpitude, it concluded, because "theft or larceny was a crime
at common law involving an act intrinsically and morally wrong and malum in se." Id. But
see United States ex rel. Griffo v. McCandless, 28 F.2d 287, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1928) (finding
agreement among the federal courts that moral turpitude did not signify malum in se).
More recently, Judge Posner noted that the distinction "between crimes that are malum in
se and crimes that are malum prohibitum" is reflected in moral turpitude jurisprudence. Mei
v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2004).
418 United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) aff'd, 210 F.
860 (2d Cir. 1914).
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The scienter-based approach had early critics who argued forcefully that the
scienter question was the wrong one to ask in a moral turpitude analysis. For
example, in United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day,4 1 9 an early deportation case
involving a prohibition violation, Judge Learned Hand insisted that an
interpretation focusing only on willfulness would make a nullity of the "moral
turpitude" language in the 1917 Act because "[a]ll crimes violate some law" and
"all deliberate crimes involve the intent to do so." 4 20 Judge Hand argued that
because Congress "added as a condition that [a crime] must itself be shamefully
immoral" it "could not have meant to make the willfulness of the act a test." 421
Determining whether something is "shamefully immoral," he claimed, requires
instead that courts make "some estimate, necessarily based on conjecture, as to
what people generally feel."422 In the case before him, Judge Hand refused to find
that the crime of selling or possessing whiskey in violation of a prohibition law
was a crime of moral turpitude. It was not clear to him "that among the commonly
accepted mores the sale or possession of liquor . .. occupies so grave a place . . . ,

rightly or wrongly."4 2 3
Judge Hand's position that the standard necessitated reference to community
mores was anomalous, as was his confidence in his ability to assess those mores.
Even he acknowledged that federal courts were already divided on the question of
whether liquor law violations involved moral turpitude, a division that belied his
424
assertion of moral consensus on the issue. The very fact that the standard
seemed to call for the almost impossible task of determining "what people
generally feel" led the courts to take refuge in a substitute. Rather than make the
kind of case-specific, fact-specific, era-specific inquiry advocated by Judge Hand,
federal courts handled the moral turpitude question by citing precedent that
reproduced its core applications and then by looking for the element of scienter to
resolve cases at the margins. Indeed, a decade after Judge Hand's opinion in Iorio,
the Second Circuit changed course on prohibition offenses and, over his dissent,
relied on the scienter test to classify a liquor law violation as a crime involving
moral turpitude.425
419

420
421
422

34 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1929).
Id. at 921.
Id.
Id.

Id. Learned Hand's approach to liquor violations was a minority position. The
Second Circuit, and later the Supreme Court, affirmed that any crime with an element of
fraud, even violations for failure to pay liquor taxes, would qualify, per se, as involving
moral turpitude. See United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.
1940); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 223-24 (1951).
424 United States ex rel. Iorio, 34 F.2d at 921 (noting D.C. Circuit opinion finding that
liquor law violations constituted crime involving moral turpitude).
423

425

See United States ex rel. Berlandi, 113 F.2d at 430. The charge in Berlandi was for

a conspiracy to violate the liquor laws, and the majority's analysis focused on the intent
required for conspiracy. Id. In this sense, the case is distinguishable from United States ex
rel. Iorio, which involved an outright sale in violation of the prohibition laws. Augustus

2012]

MORAL TURPITUDE

1061

In 1951, the United States Supreme Court helped solidify the centrality of
scienter in modem moral turpitude jurisprudence.4 26 As discussed above, that
seminal case, Jordan v. De George, involved a failure to pay taxes on liquor sales
and ultimately turned on the fact that the offense involved fraud. Yet, the court's
language suggested more broadly that fraudulent or evil intent, rather than any
analysis of national or community moral beliefs, was the proper criterion for
identifying moral turpitude. 4 2 7
Following the Jordan decision, the lower courts created a line of precedent
equating moral turpitude with scienter. In 1968, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) was so confident in this approach that it wrote that "moral turpitude
normally inheres in the intent. Thus, crimes in which evil intent is not an element,
no matter how serious the act or how harmful the consequences, do not involve
moral turpitude."42 8 By 2005, the Third Circuit referred to the idea that "evil intent
is a requisite element for a crime involving moral turpitude" as a "longstanding test
29
employed by the [BIA] to determine the existence of moral turpitude.A
Similarly, the Second Circuit "concluded that 'corrupt scienter is the touchstone of
moral turpitude."' 43 0 The Ninth Circuit also characterizes itself as "requir[ing]
'willfulness' or 'evil intent' in order for a crime to be classified as one involving
moral turpitude." 431 In 2008, Attorney General Mukasey affirmed that a "finding of

Hand, writing for the majority, relied on scienter and held that conspiring to violate the
liquor tax laws was a crime of moral turpitude because of the presence of an element of
"intent to defraud." Id. Learned Hand, dissenting, reiterated his view that liquor law
violations did not violate the moral standards of a community or of the nation. Id. at 432
(Hand, J., dissenting). He argued that there was by no means a consensus that "escaping
excises on liquor" was "morally shameful." Id. Because the court's task was to "appraise
the moral repugnance of the ordinary man towards the conduct in question," Judge Hand
would not sign on to the majority's analysis. Id.
426 Jordan, 341 U.S. at
223-24.
427 Id. at 227 (citing United States ex rel. Berlandi, 113
F.2d at 430).
428 Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775 (B.I.A. 1968) (citations
omitted).
429 Partyka v. Att'y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted);
see
also Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980) ("An evil or malicious intent is said to
be the essence of moral turpitude."); Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 777 ("[M]oral
turpitude normally inheres in the intent. . . ."); P-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 117, 121 (B.I.A. 1944)
("One of the criteria adopted to ascertain whether a particular crime involves moral
turpitude is that it be accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. 'It is in the intent
that moral turpitude inheres."' (quoting United States ex rel. Meyer v. Day, 54 F.2d 336
(2d Cir. 1931))).
430 Partyka,417 F.3d at 413 (citing Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2000));
Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810, 814-15 (8th Cir. 2004); Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d
183, 186 (5th Cir. 1996).
431 Femandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1165-66 (9th
Cir. 2006).
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moral turpitude . . . requires that a perpetrator have committed [a] reprehensible act
with some form ofscienter."432

The use of a scienter analysis as a proxy for moral turpitude has accomplished
a dubious objectivity at the expense of coherence. Far from rationalizing moral
turpitude doctrine, the analysis makes it difficult for courts to explain the
continued treatment of certain core crimes, such as statutory rape, as involving
moral turpitude.433 It also has led dissenters to critize the standard as damaging to
the language of the law and thereby to the law itself. In something like the reverse
of Jeremy Bentham's vision that the public should hear conduct rules while judges
hear individual cases, 43 4 judges under the scienter approach apply an explicitly
moral standard while deciding cases based on the completely decontextualized
question, one which centers on the degree of intent required for a conviction,
irrespective of a particular individual's actual motivation, circumstances, or even
conduct. Unlike Bentham's idea, which erred on the side of allowing judges to
exercise lenity while giving the public stricter conduct rules to follow, the current
moral turpitude standard suggests to the public that crimes will be evaluated on a
moral spectrum, when in fact their classification depends on the minutiae of mens
rea gradations.
Judge Reinhardt's argument-that fraud must be a separate per se category of
moral turpitude in order to save the standard from incoherence-could extend with
equal force to the notion that moral turpitude is simply a question of scienter.
Unless there is some principled way to separate crimes that are morally repugnant
because they involve some degree of scienter from those that are inherently base,
vile, or depraved, the jurisprudence on moral turpitude produces results that are
difficult to justify. For example, crimes such as petty theft in the fifth degree or
drunk-driving on a suspended license are classified as crimes involving moral
turpitude because they require scienter. 43 5 By contrast, repeated drunk-driving
convictions, like many convictions for assault and battery, do not require proof of
scienter and thus are held not to involve moral turpitude.4 36 Given the definition of
moral turpitude, those outcomes would suggest that it is depraved to shoplift or to
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(emphasis added) (quoting Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 706 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008)
432

(internal quotation marks omitted)).
433 See, e.g., Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 922 (10th Cir. 2011) (attempting to
identify a category of "exceptional regulatory offense classified as crimes involving moral
turpitude" in order to reconcile holding that a conviction for failing to register as a sex
offender did not involve moral turpitude due to' lack of the requisite intent, with long-

standing precedent holding that statutory rape is a crime involving moral turpitude despite
lack of mens rea requirement).
434 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 1007 (1995).
435 Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 905 (en banc) (involving drunk-driving on a
suspended license); Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 253 (2d Cir. 2000) (involving petty theft
in the fifth degree).
436 Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78 (B.I.A. 2001) (en banc) (involving repeated
drunk driving).
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drive with a suspended license while drunk, while it is not depraved to assault
someone or to repeatedly drive drunk. Judge Reinhardt's argument that fraud is
simply a separate category of moral turpitude fails to explain why all scienter
crimes are morally depraved while many violent crimes that lack scienter elements
are not. The consistent inclusion of any crime with a scienter element within the
scope of moral turpitude cannot be explained away with the confusing expedient of
announcing a per se rule for fraud.
A recent Second Circuit case illustrates the problem with the scienter
approach. Michel v. INS43 7 involved a Haitian man who was ordered deported
because he had been found "in possession of stolen bus transfers."4 38 Jean Patrick
Michel was a lawful permanent resident who had entered two separate guilty pleas
to charges of "criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree." 439 The
convictions, based on the bus transfer thefts, were classified as involving moral
turpitude. 4 4 0 Then-Judge Sotomayor used a version of the scienter rule to conclude
that the BIA's classification was reasonable.44 1 Joined by Judge Cabranes, she
found that the stolen bus transfer conviction was a deportable offense because it
"specifically requires the violator's knowledge that the property was stolen."4 4 2 In
dissent, Judge Calabresi echoed Judge Hand's argument from over half a century
earlier. He pointed out the contradiction arising from a rule that focuses solely on
the element of "knowledge" yet claims to make a decision about the state of
community morality.443 Inflexibly equating immorality with intent, he argued,
"violates [the] long-standing definition of 'moral turpitude."' 4 44 Although he did
not rest his position on "the alleged triviality" of the theft, he would have required
that the BIA at least "seek to show that the stealing of transfers (or whatever
behavior it determines constitutes the minimum conduct for violating the statute),
even if seemingly a trivial act, [is] an 'inherently base, vile, or depraved' crime." 4 45
"It is hard," he wrote, "to understand how the gravity of the crime can play no part

in the inquiry." 446
206 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2000).
261.
439 Id. at 256. Michel had been a lawful permanent resident in the United States for
eighteen years, since the age of nineteen. Id.
440 Id. at 259.
4'

43 8

1 d. at

441

442

Id. at 262-65.

Id. at 263.

443 Id. at 270 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
444

Id.

5

Id. at 27 1.
Id. at 270. Judge Berzon offered a similar critique of BIA decisions in her dissent
from a moral turpitude opinion by an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit:
446

[T]he BIA has declared that the definition of a [Crime Involving Moral
Turpitude] is 'an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically
wrong, or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory
prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral turpitude."' Yet, the BIA
has designated offenses ranging from the knowing possession of child
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Ironically, because courts confronting such core cases as statutory rape and
fraud do not follow the scienter-based approach,447 the approach does not provide a
robust explanation for much of moral turpitude jurisprudence. As Judge Berzon
wrote in a recent dissent, the current scienter requirement is virtually meaningless
because it is ill-defined and overrun by exceptions. 44 8 While the BIA looks for "the
specific intent to defraud" in certain cases, in other cases, such as "violent crimes,
theft offenses and other crimes against property, sex offenses, [or] drug offense,"
the BIA "appears to require a prescribed degree of intent that varies depending on
which subcategory is at issue." 4 49 In essence, "one could find support for any
proposition if one's search pool includes all of the BIA's precedential [moral
turpitude] opinions over the last seven decades." 4 5 0
The case that provoked Judge Berzon's dissent exemplifies the abstruse lines
drawn by the scienter rule. Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit ruled that drunkdriving on a suspended license is a crime involving moral turpitude, while
acknowledging that drunk-driving, even repeatedly, is not. 4 51 Despite the
acknowledged dangers of drunk-driving, the majority reasoned that "a long
historical acceptance",4 5 2 of precedent treating drunk-driving convictions as not
involving moral turpitude was justified because "statutes that prohibit driving
under the influence typically do not require intent, but rather 'are, or are most
nearly comparable to, crimes that impose strict liability."' 4 53 Drunk-driving on a
suspended license, by contrast, required that the person "knew or should have

pornography, to the sale of "a number of packages of oleomargarine labeled as
butter, in violation of . .. the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [and] . . . with
intent to defraud," as "morally reprehensible" conduct, without specifying with
any clarity what "the nature of th[ose] act[s]" have in common.
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 923 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Fualaau, 21 1. & N. Dec. 475, 477 (B.I.A. 1996);
P-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 795, 796, 798 (B.I.A. 1955)).
447 In most instances, convictions for offenses involving fraud satisfy the scienter test.
There are, however, a number of offenses sounding in fraud that do not technically require
a finding of fraudulent intent to support a conviction. Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 927
(Berzon, J., dissenting). Courts, nonetheless, invariably find that those offenses are crimes
involving moral turpitude because they involve fraud.
448 Id.
4 49 id.
450

d
451 Id. at 932.

Id. at 913 (majority opinion) (quoting Lopez-Meza, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1188, 1194
(B.I.A. 1999)).
453 Id. (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008) ("[TJhe conduct for
which the drunk driver is convicted (driving under the influence) need not be purposeful or
deliberate.")); see Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (stating that a DUI offense
involves "accidental or negligent conduct").
452
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known of the suspension or revocation" 45 4 of his or her license, and therefore met
the Attorney General's "some form of scienter" requirement.45 5
Using scienter to distinguish drunk-driving with a suspended license from
other drunk-driving offenses might make sense if this scienter-based approach
were applied in every case, but it is not. Courts use the approach with seemingly
rule-like exaction in some cases. Yet, in others, courts continue to find the core
crimes to be outside the rule, either by treating those offenses as exceptional or by
stretching the scienter requirement to encompass them.4 56 For example, in keeping
with moral turpitude's continued resonance with the codes that regulate sexual
mores, federal courts often abandon the scienter requirement in cases involving sex
crimes. 4 5 7 The most prominent and consistent exception is for statutory rape.458 In
454 Marmolejo-Canipos,558 F.3d at 910.
415Id. at 912, 916 (referencing Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688, 706 (2008)).

At times, courts stretch the scienter rule for reasons unknown. For example, the
Seventh Circuit found that aggravated fleeing is a crime involving moral turpitude because,
although under Illinois law no mens rea was required for a conviction, the nonaggravated
version of the offense requires willfulness. Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741-42 (7th Cir.
2004).
4 See Gonzalez-Alvarado v. INS, 39 F.3d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding, in cases
involving incest convictions, that "[a] crime involving the willful commission of a base or
depraved act is a crime involving moral turpitude, whether or not the statute requires proof
of evil intent"); see also Maghsoudi v. INS, 181 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that
indecent assault conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude); Ahmed v. INS, 92 F.3d
1196, *2 (10th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (upholding BIA's deportation order
based on two convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude: sexual conduct in the third
degree and patronizing a prostitute); Babouris v. Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621, 623 (2d Cir. 1959)
(affirming deportation order without explanation for a man convicted of "soliciting men for
the purpose of committing a crime against nature or other lewdness" on moral turpitude
grounds). Some sexual crimes no longer come up under the moral turpitude classification
because they are also considered to be felonies. See Ganzhi v. Holder, 624 F.3d 23, 30 (2d
Cir. 2010) (finding conviction for sexual abuse of a minor made alien removable as having
been convicted of an aggravated felony); Restrepo v. Att'y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 791 (3d
Cir. 2010) ("The [Immigration and Nationality Act] defines aggravated felony to include,
inter alia, 'murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor."').
458 Courts have also struggled over manslaughter convictions, which typically require
only a showing of recklessness. Compare, e.g., Vidal y Planas v. Landon, 104 F. Supp.
384, 390 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (finding involuntary manslaughter not to be a crime involving
moral turpitude), with Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding
manslaughter-which requires at most a mens rea of recklessness-to be a crime involving
moral turpitude). Federal courts initially tended to draw a distinction between involuntary
and voluntary manslaughter, but if a conviction did not distinguish between the two,
contrary to their usual practice, they would err on the side of including it within the
standard. See, e.g., Sanchez-Marin, 11 1. & N. Dec. 264, 266 (B.I.A. 1965) (finding that it
was reasonable to conclude that an alien indicted for second-degree murder, but who
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of manslaughter, had committed an intentional crime
involving moral turpitude). Later, some federal courts widened this exception to the
scienter requirement by holding that reckless manslaughter involved moral turpitude,
456
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an oft-cited opinion, the Eighth Circuit upheld a deportation order for a man who
had pleaded guilty to the strict liability offense of having "sexual relations with a
female between sixteen and eighteen years of age." 4 59 Dismissing the objection
that the elements of the crime did not require any proof of criminal intent, the
majority reasoned that both the BIA and federal courts had "consistently" found
statutory rape to be a crime involving moral turpitude. 4 60 Beyond that, its logic
seemed to be that because rape itself is a crime of moral turpitude and statutory
rape is classified as rape, then statutory rape must involve moral turpitude. 461 The
dissenting judge argued, as Judge Hand noted years ago, that "the clear intent of
Congress" required the court to determine whether "the petitioner's
criminal
4 62
conduct here did or did not, factually, 'involve moral turpitude."'
Even cases involving fraud create problems for courts applying a scienterbased analysis. Fraud is the quintessential moral turpitude crime precisely because
it was understood as involving evil intent at common law and thus violated a core
honor norm requiring honest business dealings. Yet, modem statutory offenses that
sound in fraud often are framed as strict liability crimes. To bring those offenses
under the umbrella of moral turpitude, courts must ignore or strain the scienter
rule. For example, in a recent Ninth Circuit case, the petitioner, a legal permanent
resident, obtained credit cards on false pretenses and then used those cards to
obtain goods. 4 6 3 The petitioner was ordered deported for a conviction under a strict
liability statute prohibiting making a false financial statement. 46 4 Judge Noonan,
writing for the majority, began his opinion with a rarity in federal moral turpitude
opinions: a discussion of values. He explained that the case turned on "the place of
credit in our economy."4 65 As he elaborated:
Credit comes into existence through confidence-confidence that one
human being may rely on the representations of another human being.
On this utterly unmechanical, uniquely human understanding, a credit
despite the absence of intent. Franklin,72 F.3d at 573.
459 Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1023, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that "[i]f
sexual intercourse is present, and it is established that the female is under the age of
consent, the element of mens rea does not enter because of the very nature of the offense
and the interest of society in rendering such females incapable of giving consent"); see also
Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064, 1066 (4th Cir. 1976) (quoting Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d 719,
720 (9th Cir. 1927)) (finding statutory rape under Maryland law "manifestly involves
moral turpitude" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
460 Id. at 1025 (citations omitted); see also Pino v. Nicolls, 119 F. Supp. 122, 128 (D.
Mass.), aff'd, 215 F.2d 237, 247 (1st Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Pino v.

Landon, 349 U.S. 901, 901 (1955) (per curium); Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d
755, 756 (7th Cir. 1931); United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 203 F. Supp. 389, 396-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
461 Marciano,450 F.2d at 1025 (quoting Bendel, 17
F.2d at 720).
462 Id. at 1026 (Eisele, J., dissenting).
463 Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1073
(9th Cir. 2010).
44 Id. at 1081.
465 id
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economy is formed and wealth is created. To exploit, pervert and destroy
the confidence that creates credit is a vicious act. The abuse of the
distinctively human capacities to reason and to engage in rational speech,
using these capacities to harm another human, may well be considered an
act of moral turpitude.46 6
Judge Noonan went on to rule that the false statement violation was a crime
involving moral turpitude. 46 7 Taking up the "counterintuitive" task of assessing
only the elements of the crime, he acknowledged that intent to defraud was not a
i
hhe reasoned that "[firaud is implicit in the
statutory element. 468 Nevertheless,
nature of a crime" under the California statute because "[t]he fraudster
intentionally seeks and obtains something of value by means of his
6 Fraud, in turn, is always a crime involving moral turpitude.
misrepresentation."40
Judge Tashima, in dissent, pointed out that an identical Connecticut statute had
been found by the BIA not to involve the requisite scienter for moral turpitude.470
The debate between the two judges shows the strength of the honor code link
between fraud and moral turpitude and the malleability of the scienter analysis
when judges wish it to stretch. It also illustrates why courts are reluctant to apply
the moral turpitude standard by engaging in value-laden analyses grounded in their
views of community mores. Many nineteenth-century judges were loath to do this
in the simpler context of assessing reputational injury.4 7 Contemporary judges
now confront a world in which judgments based on extra-legal moral beliefs, even
though authorized by the legislature, can invite criticism from colleagues, if not
also from the media and legislators. In his dissent, Judge Tashima not only asserted
that Judge Noonan was wrong about the law, he also described the majority
opinion as "an elaborate apologia of Wall Street and the banking industry [which]
engages in speculation on the causes of the 'current economic crisis."' 47 2 In his
view, the task of the judge was not to think about society's needs or the true nature
of the crime, but instead to determine whether a conviction under the statute
necessarily required proof of fraudulent intent.473 The majority's failure to apply
the categorical approach, he argued, as well as its unabashed use of normative and
even condemnatory language, led it to transmute a ninety-seven-year-old statute
that "was enacted decades before the credit card was invented" into a law against
credit card fraud.474 One wonders, however, if Judge Noonan's approach was not

466 id.
467

Id. at 1078-79.
at 1075.

468
469 Id.

Id. at 1075-76.

470 Id. at 1082 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (quoting Kinney, 10 1. & N. Dec. 548, 549

(B.I.A. 1964)).
471 See supra Part
I.
473

Tijani, 628 F.3d at 1082-83 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
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more in keeping with the purpose of the moral turpitude standard than the
acontextual scienter test he eschewed.
CONCLUSION

Despite its failings, the allure of moral turpitude is undeniable. Historically, it
offered the promise of an easy proxy for reputational harm, and then more simply,
for a bad reputation with attendant assumptions about character. Still later, the
country found itself in need of a way to identify persons who should be prohibited
from entry. In 1985, the California Supreme Court proved that moral turpitude is
not a relic when it elected to retain the standard, despite its flaws, as a test for
impeachment evidence. It may be that the persistence of the standard-beyond a
story of congressional disinterest and judicial avoidance-reflects a continuing
longing for legal standards that invoke our common conscience. Codes cannot fill
all of the gaps, nor do we want them to. At the same time, this Article suggests that
we must be wary of the path we take to accomplish that goal.
Viewed in the context of its longer history, the moral turpitude standard
provides a powerful counterpoint to the claim, made frequently in recent years, that
judges are eager to judge based on their own moral intuitions rather than the law.
Paradoxically, the very standard that would provide most leeway for judges to be
activist in the service of their own values has instead produced judgments so rigid
in their adherence to precedent that nineteenth-century honor norms are still the
best predictor of their outcomes. Courts seem more likely to reason about
community moral beliefs or absolute right and wrong if they are adjudicating
disputes over speeding tickets than if they are determining whether a particular
crime involved moral turpitude.
Recent criticism of judicial activism 4 7 5 provides one possible explanation for
courts' avoidance of the moral in moral turpitude. Yet, modern criticism cannot
explain why nineteenth-century judges decided difficult moral turpitude cases
based on anything but moral reasoning. That avoidance may come, instead, from
the inherent difficulty of making and justifying decisions about ambiguous moral
questions. Unlike many legal standards that implicitly rely on moral judgments,
moral turpitude used the word moral baldly, calling on courts to make a moral
pronouncement with no legal phraseology with which to cover it. Rather than do
so, as this Article shows, courts opted to blindly follow precedent wherever
possible and to use proxies that were better understood and easier to explain when
considering difficult cases on the margin.

475 See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Court's Potential to Goad Voters Swings to Democrats,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2012, at A14 (describing opportunity for Democrats to win votes by
criticizing recent judicial activism by conservative members of the Supreme Court);
Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Order in the Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2005),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01EODE 1130F937A35753CIA9639C8
B63 (calling on liberals to join conservatives in opposing "judicial activism" by
"undemocratic courts").
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Why, given its tortured history, the strange boundaries it creates in current
law, and the blatant inefficiency that comes from using such a contested and illunderstood standard in a law as vital as the immigration statute, is moral turpitude
still with us? Legislatures, it seems, are no more comfortable with difficult moral
line-drawing questions than are courts. Even as many of its members have
criticized courts for allegedly overreaching on values questions,476 Congress has
held on to a standard that provides an open, if largely unaccepted invitation to
judges to do just that.
Perhaps most troubling from this account of moral turpitude is the lack of
transparency from courts administering the standard. Courts' insistence that they
are basing judgments on the baseness, vileness, or depravity of an action, when in
fact they are. simply looking for "some form of scienter," 4 7 7 has created such
confusion that the courts themselves seem lost when trying to account for their
own doctrine. The Supreme Court has recently held that the Constitution requires
that a defendant be informed of the deportation consequences of his or her plea.47 8
Given the vagaries of the federal moral turpitude standard, even with an existing
"Handbook on Moral Turpitude," this will be no simple task.479
Finally, this account suggests the need to grapple with a founding vision of
the polity that is still very much alive in the law. It may be that the vision of hardworking citizens whose goods are sound and who never cheat, lie, or steal remains
our ideal. But how closely we would demand that lawful permanent residents stick
to a strict version of that ideal in order to remain in this country may be an open
question. Also open to debate may be moral turpitude's suggestion that minor
violent crime is less problematic than minor sex crimes, or that women who are
prostitutes are less truthful than men who commit assaults. These substantive
issues, as well as the more theoretical questions about law, morality, delegation,
and judging, among others, will be important in any dialogue on the future of the
moral turpitude standard. That future will, no doubt, continue to be informed by its
past:
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conservatives opposed to "judicial activism" targeted three federal judges for possible
impeachment citing their "policies on education, on justice, [and] on morality" (quoting
Rep. Tom DeLay)).
477 Silva-Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. 687, 706 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008).
478 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
479 U.S. Dep't of State, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 9 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL
§ 40.21(a) (2010), availableat www.state.gov/documents/organization/8694 1.pdf.

